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ABSTRACT
Imagine that a close friend is raped, and you encourage her to
report it to the police. At first, she thinks that the police are taking
her report seriously, but the investigation does not seem to move for-
ward. The next thing she knows, they accuse her of lying and ulti-
mately file charges against her. You and your friend are in shock;
this outcome never entered your minds. This nightmare may seem
inconceivable, but it has in fact occurred repeatedly in both the
United States and Britain—countries that are typically lauded for
their high levels of gender equality. In Britain, where perverting the
course of justice is a serious crime with a potential term of life in
prison, many rape complainants have been sent to prison for two
and three year terms. This five-part Article analyzes this problem
and sets out recommendations for legal reform.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 2014, British law student Rhiannon Brooker was sen-
tenced to prison for three-and-a-half years on charges of attempting to per-
vert the course of justice (“PCOJ”). These charges resulted from Rhiannon
reporting to the police the multiple episodes of domestic violence and rape
that she had experienced at the hands of her then-boyfriend.1 A jury found
her guilty of twelve of the twenty counts of PCOJ brought against her dur-
ing an eleven-week trial, indicating that they did not believe that she was an
actual victim of rape and domestic violence.2 Her sentence caused her to be
separated from her nine-month-old daughter.3 The judge in Brooker’s case,
Julian Lambert, said that she had acted in an “utterly wicked” way.4 Four
years earlier, Lambert also presided as judge in the case of 52-year-old Gail
Sherwood, who was convicted of three counts of PCOJ when a jury simi-
larly did not believe that she had twice been raped by a stalker who left her
tied to a fence in the woods.5 Sherwood’s trial lasted six weeks and she was
sent to prison for two years, enduring a separation from her three daughters,
the youngest of whom were fourteen and sixteen at the time.6 At Sher-
wood’s trial, Lambert said that Sherwood was a “cunning and highly deceit-
ful” woman responsible for a “huge waste” of police resources.7
In addition to having their cases heard by the same judge, Brooker and
Sherwood were similar in another way—they were both adamant that they
were in fact victims of the crimes they had reported to the police, and that
authorities did not take their complaints seriously or properly investigate the
crimes. Both women maintain their innocence today.
“Jane Doe,”8 a seventeen-year-old British girl, was somewhat more for-
tunate than Brooker and Sherwood. Doe was raped in 2012 and was
charged with PCOJ after police officers failed to fully investigate her case.
The police concluded within just two days of receiving her initial complaint
1. Steven Morris, Trainee Barrister Jailed for False Rape Claims, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June
26, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/26/trainee-barrister-
jailed-false-rape-claims.
2. Id.; Steven Morris, Law Graduate Found Guilty of Falsely Accusing Former Boyfriend of
Rape, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 5, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/
jun/05/law-graduate-guilty-falsely-accusing-boyfriend-rape.
3. Morris, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Steven Morris, Woman Gets Two Years for False Rape Claims, THE GUARDIAN, March
4, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/mar/04/rape-claims-gail-sher-
wood; Letter from Gail Sherwood to Caroline (July 5, 2008) (on file with author).
6. Letter from Gail Sherwood, supra note 5.
7. Id.
8. Press reports do not identify the victim by name.
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that she was lying.9 The officers had failed to send a t-shirt for forensic
testing even though they had received information indicating that the shirt
might contain the rapist’s DNA.10 After Doe’s arrest, Doe’s mother filed a
formal complaint. The case was then re-examined and the t-shirt was sent
for forensic testing.11 The testing did in fact reveal the rapist’s DNA, and
Liam Foard was convicted of rape and sentenced to six years in prison.12
Jane Doe was subsequently awarded £20,000 compensation for her poor
treatment by the police force.13 As Jane Doe’s case reveals, genuine rape
victims have been charged with false reporting as a direct consequence of
police failure to fully and properly investigate their complaints. Are Brooker
and Sherwood also genuine rape victims whose cases were not taken seri-
ously by police or prosecutors? If so, they are not unique. In both the
United States and Britain, rape victims have been disbelieved by police, who
have failed to investigate their cases and have ultimately charged them with
false reporting.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part One situates the prosecutions
of disbelieved rape complainants in the larger context, which is the wide-
spread and systematic failure to prosecute rape in the West. These failures to
prosecute go hand-in-hand with a firmly entrenched tendency of police, in
both the United States and Britain, to approach rape complainants with
skepticism.
Part Two analyzes the prosecutions of disbelieved rape complainants in
light of international best practice guidelines for rape investigation. It argues
that cases where complainants are charged with false reporting are marred
by a failure to fully investigate the rape complaint in accordance with rec-
ommended best practice. This Article uses several case studies to demon-
strate that the charging decisions in these cases cannot withstand scrutiny
when best practices are applied.
Part Three analyzes further factors that fuel prosecutions of disbelieved
rape complainants—the performance management pressures that provide
police with perverse incentives to downgrade reports of sexual violence and
even to pressure victims to retract their allegations.
Part Four describes the consequences of the problem, including the
human rights violations that result, the chilling effect that these practices
have on sexual assault victims, and the perpetuation of rape myths. This
9. Sandra Laville, Rape Victim Falsely Accused of Lying by Police Wins £20,000 Payout,
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section also calls attention to one of the most critical consequences—that
these practices allow rapists to continue to offend with impunity.
Part Five then provides recommendations for ending the prosecution
of rape complainants, improving rape investigations, and remedying the
miscarriages of justice that have occurred.
I. THE CHRONIC FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE RAPE IN THE WEST
Since Women Against Rape began in London in 1976, we have
been campaigning for all rape to be taken seriously. We’ve won ma-
jor changes in the law, such as the criminalization of rape in mar-
riage. A mass movement of survivors demanding justice has put a
new spotlight on rapists, particularly those in positions of power. The
rape and sexual assault of thousands of children, most of them in
care, have caused public outrage. But while more survivors are com-
ing forward, the conviction rate for reported rape remains a shame-
ful 6.7%.
—Lisa Longstaff, Women Against Rape14
The problem of rape complainants being charged with false reporting
must be understood within a larger context in which Western countries do a
surprisingly poor job of investigating and prosecuting rape. A growing body
of evidence demonstrates that police and prosecutors often fail to respond
appropriately to complaints of sexual violence. They fail to adequately in-
vestigate such complaints, are reluctant to initiate prosecutions, and corre-
spondingly obtain few convictions of rapists.15 These failings are consistent
across many countries lauded for their high levels of development and gen-
der equality including the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
Scandinavian countries.16 As this Article will demonstrate, the practice of
14. Memorandum from Lisa Longstaff and Nina Lopez, Women Against Rape (Aug. 8,
2015) (on file with author).
15. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CAPITOL OFFENSE: POLICE MISHANDLING OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (2013), http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0113ForUpload_2.pdf [hereinafter DC
REPORT]; INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, INVESTIGATING
SEXUAL ASSAULTS: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES PAPER (2005), www.ncdsv.org/images/
InvestigatingSexualAssaultsConceptsIssues.pdf [hereinafter IACP GUIDELINES];
VIVIEN STERN, GOVERNMENT EQUALITIES OFFICE, HOME OFFICE, THE STERN RE-
VIEW 28–55 (2010), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110608160754/
http:/www.equalities.gov.uk/PDF/Stern_Review_acc_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter STERN
REVIEW].
16. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CASE CLOSED: RAPE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NORDIC COUNTRIES SUMMARY REPORT (2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/
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charging rape complainants with false reporting is grounded in a failure to
investigate rape and is, accordingly, one consequence of this landscape of
investigatory failure.
The following key facts shape the landscape of rape prosecution today:
first, most reliable studies indicate that only about 2–3% of rape complaints
are false, and that rate is lower than the rate of false reports for other
crimes.17 Second, the vast majority of rapes are not reported to the police.18
Third, most rapes are committed by serial rapists.19 Serial rapists represent a
severe threat to public safety because they will typically go on to rape addi-
tional victims if complaints against them are not taken seriously and are not
properly investigated by the police.20 Fourth, very few rapes result in the
conviction of the perpetrator. For example, in Britain only about 6% of
reported rapes have resulted in a conviction.21 Fifth, police and prosecutors,
like society generally, are affected by victim-blaming myths about rape and
may regard a rape complainant with skepticism, disbelief, or with a victim-
blaming attitude.22 And finally, studies on attrition demonstrate that police
decline to investigate many cases that they label as false allegations, and that
there is further attrition in rape cases at many points farther along in the
case building process.23
library/asset/ACT77/001/2010/en/5ba7f635-f2c3-4b50-86ea-e6c3428cf179/act77
0012010eng.pdf [hereinafter NORDIC COUNTRIES REPORT] (detailing harmful or
prejudiced law enforcement practices with respect to victims of sexual assault in four
Nordic Countries—Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands); DC REPORT,
supra note 15 (detailing similar practices in Washington, DC).
17. See, e.g., LIZ KELLY ET AL., HOME OFFICE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND STATIS-
TICS DIRECTORATE, HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY 293: A GAP OR A CHASM?
ATTRITION IN REPORTED RAPE CASES 53 (2005), http://webarchive.national
archives.gov.uk/20110218135832/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/hors293.pdf;
David Lisak et al., False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years of Re-
ported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1330 (2010); Kimberly Lon-
sway et al., False Reports: Moving Beyond the Issue to Successfully Investigate and
Prosecute Non-Stranger Sexual Assaults, 3 THE VOICE, 1, 2 (2009), http://
www.ndaa.org/pdf/the_voice_vol_3_no_1_2009.pdf.
18. KELLY ET AL., supra note 17, at 13; Lisak et al., supra note 17, at 1331; SYLVIA
WALBY & JONATHAN ALLEN, HOME OFFICE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND STA-
TISTICS DIRECTORATE, HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY 276: DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT, AND STALKING: FINDINGS FROM THE BRITISH CRIME
SURVEY 97 (2004), http://www.avaproject.org.uk/media/28792/hors276.pdf.
19. Lonsway et al., supra note 17 at 51.
20. See id.
21. KELLY ET AL., supra note 17, at 1.
22. Lisak et al., supra note 17, at 1321; MARTIN D. SCHWARTZ, NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF JUSTICE VISITING FELLOWSHIP: POLICE INVESTIGATION OF RAPE – ROAD-
BLOCKS AND SOLUTIONS, Doc. No. 232667 53 (2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf-
files1/nij/grants/232667.pdf; KELLY ET AL., supra note 17, at xi, 83.
23. KELLY ET AL., supra note 17, at 83.
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A. The Heart of the Failure to Prosecute Rape: Failing to Believe Victims
and Failing to Investigate
The heart of the failure to prosecute rape lies at the nexus of two
related issues—police failure to believe complainants, and their correspond-
ing failure to investigate. These linked problems have been the subject of
several official reports, as well as the subject of a landmark court decision in
Britain. They have also attracted scrutiny from the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) and the Department of Education (“DOE”) in the United States.
1. A Culture of Suspicion: Police Failure to Believe Rape Victims
The systemic failure to properly investigate and prosecute rape begins
with a failure to believe victims. When police do not believe victims of
sexual assault, they tend to not take them seriously and, consequently, do
not adequately investigate their cases. A number of studies, investigations,
and a key court decision have identified police failure to believe victims as a
critical factor in rape investigation failures.
A study commissioned by the British Home Office on reasons for at-
trition in rape cases found that there is a “culture of suspicion” towards rape
complainants among police officers, even among some of those who are
specialists in rape investigation.24 This study noted that there is an embed-
ded tendency to disbelieve rape complainants within the police and quoted
one officer as saying: “I have dealt with hundreds and hundreds of rapes in
the last few years, and I can honestly probably count on both hands the
ones that I believe are truly genuine.”25 The study also quoted a forensic
nurse who stated that police officers’ “automatic disbelief of a complainant”
is a problem that she has observed “time and time again.”26 The study con-
cluded that this culture of skepticism reinforced an investigative culture that
emphasized looking for ways to prove that a complaint was false—some-
thing that occurred “at the expense of a careful investigation, in which the
evidence collected is evaluated.”27
These findings are corroborated by three separate American studies,
which have also found unduly high levels of skepticism toward rape com-
plainants among police officers. First, a 2013 Human Rights Watch
(“HRW”) report on how the Washington, D.C. police respond to rape
found that rape complainants were regularly disbelieved and treated with
24. Id. at 51.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 52.
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skepticism.28 The report also found that police sometimes claimed to have
conducted a “thorough investigation” when the actual investigation was
minimal and was carried out primarily to undermine the victim’s credibility
rather than to investigate the rape allegations.29 The report also found that
D.C. police frequently threatened to charge rape complainants with false
reporting if the complainants did not retract their allegations.30 Accord-
ingly, this report’s findings suggest that failure to believe victims was the
first step in a chain of poor police practices that also involved declining to
investigate sexual assault cases and ultimately threatening complainants with
false reporting charges.
Second, research has demonstrated that throughout the United States,
the belief that women often lie about being raped is widely held among
police officers even though the vast majority of rape allegations are truth-
ful.31 Sociologist Martin Schwartz asked 428 police officers to estimate what
percentage of all reported rape cases were false; overall this group estimated
that 32.7% of all rape allegations were false despite the fact that the major-
ity were in fact true.32 Importantly, this study found that female police of-
ficers and more experienced officers were more likely to believe that rape
victims were truthful.33
Third, a study conducted by Amy Dellinger Page surveyed 891 police
officers and found that 53% of these officers believed that up to 50% of
victims lied about being raped.34 A further 10% of these officers believed
that between 51 and 100% of rape victims were lying.35 Echoing the find-
ings of Schwartz and Page, an attorney with many years of experience ad-
dressing sexual assault in the state of Kentucky stated:
The biggest obstacle in rape investigation is that police think
women lie. This is a very widespread attitude. One man, who
was the third-in-command with the state police, told me that in
thirty years he had never investigated a “real rape.” The state
28. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CAPITOL OFFENSE: POLICE MISHANDLING OF SEXUAL
ASSAULT CASES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, FACT SHEET 9 (2013), http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/FactSheet_0.pdf [hereinafter DC REPORT
FACT SHEET].
29. Id.
30. DC REPORT, supra note 15, at 15–16.
31. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 22.
32. SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 44.
33. Id. at 28–29.
34. Amy Dellinger Page, Gateway to Reform? Policy Implications of Police Officers’ Atti-
tudes Toward Rape, 33 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 44, 55 (2008).
35. Id.
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police is Kentucky’s top law enforcement agency. That gives a
sense of the backwardness of the attitudes.36
In contrast to this culture of suspicion, both American and British
studies show that only 2–10% of rape allegations are false, and that the
most reliable methodology has produced estimates in the 2–3% range.37
Accordingly, although police skepticism towards rape victims is widespread,
such skepticism has no factual basis and is unfairly prejudicial.
2. Major Reports on the Failure to Investigate Rape in the West
The failure of prosecutors and police to respond adequately to rape
has been the subject of several reports, including major reports by Human
Rights Watch in 2013 on the failure to investigate rape in Washington,
D.C., and by Amnesty International in 2010 on the failure to prosecute
rape in the Scandinavian countries.38 Additionally, in 2010, the U.S. Senate
conducted hearings into the chronic failure to investigate and prosecute rape
in the United States, and Baroness Vivien Stern led a similar effort in the
UK.39
The Stern Review, published in 2010—the same year that Gail Sher-
wood was convicted of perverting the course of justice—examined how rape
is investigated and handled by police and prosecutors in Britain, and made
suggestions for improving the handling of rape cases.40 The Stern Review
found that some rape victims have received appalling treatment at the hands
of the police and that some serial rapists attacked large numbers of victims
because police did not believe complainants and did not make rape investi-
gation a sufficiently high priority.41 It also found a pattern on the part of
the police of disbelief, disrespect, victim-blaming, minimizing the serious-
ness of rape, and therefore deciding not to record it as a crime.42 In short,
the Stern Review found that police failure to investigate rape was closely
linked to their tendency to disbelieve rape complainants.
36. Telephone interview with MaryLee Underwood (Oct, 10, 2013) (Ms. Underwood
worked as an attorney with the Kentucky Association of Sexual Assault Programs for
eleven years).
37. Lisak et al., supra note 17, at 1329–31; KELLY ET AL., supra note 17, at 83.
38. See DC REPORT, supra note 15; NORDIC COUNTRIES REPORT, supra note 16.
39. Rape in the United States: The Chronic Failure to Report and Investigate Rape Cases:
Hearing before the Subcomm. On Crime and Drugs of the Comm. On the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 107 (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg64687/
pdf/CHRG-111shrg64687.pdf [hereinafter Rape in the United States Hearing];
STERN REVIEW, supra note 15.
40. STERN REVIEW, supra note 15, at 96–125.
41. Id. at 3–5.
42. Id. at 14.
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The 2010 U.S. Senate hearings on the chronic failure to investigate
rape found a similar link between the practices of disbelieving rape com-
plainants and failing to investigate. Carol E. Tracy of the Women’s Law
Project testified:
Initially I thought the reports of egregious police conduct were
isolated incidents. However, it is clear that we are seeing chronic
and systemic patterns of police refusing to accept cases for inves-
tigation, misclassifying cases to non-criminal categories so that
investigations do not occur, and “unfounding” complaints by
determining that women are lying about being sexually as-
saulted. Victims are interrogated as though they are criminals,
are presumptively disbelieved, are threatened with lie detector
tests and/or arrest, and are blamed for the outrageous conduct of
perpetrators.43
Tracy provides support for the notion that some “false” rape reports are
actually the result of police misconduct and failure to investigate. In light of
how widespread police failures are in relation to rape investigation, it is
extraordinary that no oversight mechanisms are in place to ensure that rape
complainants are not improperly charged with false reporting by police of-
ficers who are eager to dispense with cases by any means necessary. In 1993,
former New York City sex crimes prosecutor Alice Vachss described police
who fail to investigate rape and who blame rape victims for the conduct of
perpetrators as “collaborators” with rapists.44 As this Article will demon-
strate, this state of affairs continues in many police departments in both
Britain and the United States.
3. Britain: the DSD & NBV Decision on the
Failure to Investigate Rape
Official bodies in both the United States and Britain have begun to
recognize that such egregious rape investigation failures violate the funda-
mental rights of complainants. In 2014, a British court found that the po-
lice failure to properly investigate rape is a violation of the British Human
Rights Act (“HRA”) and the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR”) because it subjects the complainants to cruel and inhuman treat-
43. Rape in the United States Hearing, supra note 39, at 13.
44. See generally ALICE VACHSS, SEX CRIMES: TEN YEARS ON THE FRONT LINES PROSE-
CUTING RAPISTS AND CONFRONTING THEIR COLLABORATORS (1994).
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ment under Article 3 of both conventions.45 The case was a lawsuit brought
against the London Metropolitan Police by DSD and NBV, two victims of
a taxi driver who drugged and raped over eighty-five of his passengers.46
The court held that Article 3 of the ECHR imposes upon the police a
duty to conduct timely investigations into severe and violent acts perpe-
trated by private parties.47 The duty is triggered when a person is a victim of
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.48 Allegations of rape and
sexual assault fall within this category because of the grave and serious na-
ture of these offenses.49 The court of appeals upheld the decision in June
2015, and the two victims received financial settlements from the police.50
4. United States: Federal Investigation into the Handling of Rape
Complaints in Missoula, Montana
In 2012, the DOJ and DOE commenced investigations into whether
sexual assault complaints were handled appropriately by the Missoula, Mon-
tana, police department, the Missoula County Attorney’s Office
(“MCAO”), and the University of Montana.51 The investigations found
substantial evidence that all of the entities involved responded poorly to
sexual violence.52 For instance, the MCAO discriminated against women by
45. DSD & NBV v. The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, [2014] EWHC
QB 436, [10], [14], (U.K.) http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/
Documents/Judgments/dsd-and-nbv-v-met-police.pdf.
46. DSD & NBV, [2014] EWHC QB 436, [1] (U.K.).
47. DSD & NBV, [2014] EWHC QB 436, [14] (U.K.).
48. DSD & NBV, [2014] EWHC QB 436, [3], [214] (U.K.).
49. DSD & NBV, [2014] EWHC QB 436, [215] (U.K.).
50. DSD & NVD, [2014] EWHC QB 436, [436] (U.K.). The DSD & NBV decision
was upheld in June, 2015. See Press Association, Met Loses Appeal Against Compensa-
tion Ruling for John Worboys Assault Victims, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 30, 2015, http:/
/www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/30/met-lose-appeal-john-worboys-com-
pensation-victims.
51. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Justice Dept. Reaches Settlement to Reform the Mis-
soula, Mont. Police Dept.’s Response to Sexual Assault (May 15, 2013), (http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-reform-missoula-
mont-police-departments-response-sexual); Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Justice
Dept. Finds Substantial Evidence of Gender Bias in Missoula Cnty. Attorney’s Of-
fice (Feb. 14, 2014) (http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-finds-sub-
stantial-evidence-gender-bias-missoula-county-attorney-s-office).
52. Letter from Anurima Bhargava, Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div.,
Educ. Opportunities Section & Gary Jackson, Reg’l Dir., U.S. Dept. of Educ., Of-
fice of Civil Rights, Seattle Office, to Royce Engstrom, President, Univ. of Montana,
& Lucy France, Univ. Counsel, Univ. of Montana (May 9, 2013) (http://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2013/05/09/um-ltr-findings.pdf); Let-
ter from Michael W. Cotter, United States Attorney, Dist. of Montana & Thomas
E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Royce C. Engstrom, Presi-
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failing to prosecute sexual assault cases, attached low priority to such cases,
treated complainants with disrespect, and frequently made statements that
diminished the seriousness of sexual violence and minimized the culpability
of those who commit it.53 The Missoula Police Department was found to
respond inadequately to rape complaints by failing to collect evidence, fail-
ing to obtain witness statements, failing to develop evidence regarding
whether victims were incapacitated by drugs or alcohol, and failing to probe
suspects about whether or how they obtained the victims’ consent.54
The investigations found strong evidence that the inadequate response
to sexual violence violated the U.S. Constitution and several federal anti-
discrimination laws.55 Each of the entities investigated entered into agree-
ments with the DOJ and/or DOE in order to substantially improve their
responses to sexual assault and to ensure that they eliminated gender bias
and discrimination.56 The DOJ and DOE indicated that the agreement
dent, Univ. of Montana (May 9, 2013) (http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/docu-
ments/missoulafind_5-9-13.pdf); Letter from Michael W. Cotter, United States
Attorney, Dist. of Montana & Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil
Rights Div., to John Engen, Mayor (May 15, 2013) (http://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/spl/documents/missoulapdfind_5-15-13.pdf); Letter from Michael W. Cotter,
United States Attorney, Dist. of Montana, & Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant At-
torney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Fred Van Valkenburg, Cnty. Attorney (Feb. 14,
2014) (http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/missoula_ltr_2-14-14.pdf).
53. See Letter from Cotter & Samuels to Van Valkenburg, supra note 52, at 2–3.
54. See Letter from Cotter & Perez to Engen, supra note 52, at 7–9.
55. These anti-discrimination laws include the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title IV of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and Title IX of the Educations Amendments of 1972. The investiga-
tions into the University of Montana and the Missoula Police Department con-
cluded in May, 2013. See Press Release, DOJ/Mont. Police Dept., supra note 51.
The investigation into the MCAO concluded in February, 2014. See Press Release,
DOJ/MCAO, supra note 51.
56. Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Dept. Justice and the City of
Missoula Regarding the Missoula Police Dept.’s Response to Sexual Assault (May 15,
2013) (http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/05/15/missoulapd-
settle_5-15-13.pdf); Agreement Between the Montana Attorney General and the
Missoula Cnty Attorney’s Office (June 2014) (https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/
uploads/MTAGO-MC-June2014.pdf); Resolution Agreement Among the Univ. of
Mont. - Missoula, the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Educ. Opportunities
Section and the U.S. Dept. of Educ., Office for Civil Rights (May 8, 2013) (http://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/05/09/montanaagree.pdf); Agree-
ment Between the Montana Attorney General and the Missoula Cnty Attorney’s
Office (June 2014) (https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/MTAGO-MC-
June2014.pdf); Resolution Agr. Among the Univ. of Mont.–Missoula, the U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Educ. Opportunities Section and the U.S. Dept.
of Educ., Office for Civil Rights (May 8, 2013) (http://www.justice.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/crt/legacy/2013/05/09/montanaagree.pdf).
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they had reached with the University of Montana would “serve as a
blueprint for colleges and universities throughout the country to protect
students from sexual harassment and assault.”57
The DOE is now investigating over one hundred colleges and univer-
sities for responding inadequately to sexual assault.58 The sheer number of
these investigations is further evidence that the failure to respond adequately
to sexual assault complaints is a widespread and systematic problem across
the United States.
B. Perverting Justice: the Prosecution of Genuine Rape Victims
In light of the high levels of police skepticism toward rape complain-
ants and the accompanying failures to investigate, three things are clear.
First, failure to believe victims substantially impedes the investigation pro-
cess since police have no incentive to investigate crimes that they do not
believe occurred. Second, perpetrators can more easily get away with rape if
they know that their victims will not be believed and that police will not
bother to investigate. And finally, the consequences of police skepticism for
disbelieved rape complainants are very serious. Not only does police skepti-
cism leave perpetrators free to reoffend, such skepticism also means that
police may take their disbelief one step further and actually charge genuine
victims with false reporting.
Rape survivor Sara Reedy gave direct evidence of this problem at the
2010 Senate hearings on rape.59 She shared her harrowing account of being
raped while working a late night shift at a Pennsylvania convenience store
by a man who also robbed the store.60 The detective assigned to her case did
not believe her and ultimately refused to investigate the case, instead charg-
ing her with false reporting.61 Eventually, her name was cleared when a
different detective caught her assailant, Wilbur Brown, a serial rapist who
57. See Letter from Bhargava & Jackson to Engstrom supra note 52.
58. These investigations are being conducted under Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments Act of 1972. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Educ., U.S. Dept. of Educ. Releases
List of Higher Educ. Institutions with Open Title IX Sexual Violence Investigations
(May 1, 2014) (http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-re-
leases-list-higher-education-institutions-open-title-ix-sexual-violence-investigations);
Tyler Kingkade, 106 Colleges Are Under Federal Investigation For Sexual Assault Cases,
HUFFINGTON POST, April 6, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/06/
colleges-federal-investigation-title-ix-106_n_7011422.html; Edwin Rios, The Feds
Are Investigating 106 Colleges for Mishandling Sexual Assault. Is Yours One of Them?,
MOTHER JONES, Apr. 8, 2014, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/04/de-
partment-of-education-investigation-colleges-sexual-assault.
59. Rape in the United States Hearing, supra note 39, at 16–17.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 17.
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confessed to twelve rapes, including Reedy’s.62 Reedy testified: “[a]fter this
experience, it left me concerned if I would ever be able to rely on an officer
to do his job. Because of Detective Evanson’s uncooperative attitude and
unwillingness to believe me . . . a serial rapist was allowed to continue at-
tacking and assaulting other women.”63 Reedy sued the police and ulti-
mately obtained a $1.5 million settlement.64
Similar cases also show a link between disbelieving a victim, failure to
investigate, and ultimately charging the victim with false reporting. The
police in Madison, Wisconsin, victimized “Patty” when she reported that
someone entered her home at night and raped her.65 Madison police ac-
cused Patty of lying and even coerced her into falsely confessing that she lied
about the rape.66 In so doing, they did not fully investigate Patty’s case, and
overlooked important connections between her case and a similar sexual
assault that was committed just a few days later.67 This failure to investigate
meant that there was a delay of several years in identifying Patty’s rapist.
When he was finally identified through DNA evidence, Patty’s name was
cleared and she received a financial settlement from the Madison city
council.68
Another rape victim, eighteen-year-old D.M., in 2008 was similarly
targeted for prosecution by her local police in the state of Washington.69
Just a few days after D.M. reported the rape, the police pressured her into
admitting that she had lied about being raped, and they dropped their in-
vestigation.70 After D.M.’s prosecution for false reporting, her rapist, Marc
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Joanna Walters, Sara Reedy, the rape victim accused of lying and jailed by US police,
wins $1.5m payout, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2012/dec/15/sara-reedy-rape-victim-wins-police-payout.
65. See BILL LUEDERS, CRY RAPE: THE TRUE STORY OF ONE WOMAN’S HARROWING
QUEST FOR JUSTICE 66–67 (2006) (describing how an officer informed the victim
he would charge her with obstructing an officer after she denied she made up the
story of her rape).
66. See id. at 60–63 (depicting police interrogation).
67. Id. at 193–94. (noting that in both cases, the assailant “grabbed [the victim’s] hair
and pulled her head down toward his groin.” The police overlooked this similarity in
the rapist’s modus operandi.).
68. Id. at 266.
69. See T. Christian Miller & Ken Armstrong, An Unbelievable Story of Rape, PROPUB-
LICA (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/false-rape-accusations-an-
unbelievable-story; see also Casey McNerthney, Police: Lynnwood Rape Report was a
Hoax, SEATTLE PI (Aug. 19, 2008, 3:00 PM), http://blog.seattlepi.com/seattle911/
2008/08/19/police-lynnwood-rape-report-was-a-hoax/.
70. See Mike Carter, Woman Sues After Lynnwood Police Didn’t Believe She was Raped,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 11, 2013, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/woman-
sues-after-lynnwood-police-didnrsquot-believe-she-was-raped/ (quoting D.M.’s
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O’Leary, was caught in Colorado and was linked to D.M.’s rape through
pictures on his mobile phone.71 He was ultimately found to be responsible
for several rapes, many of which occurred after police failed to investigate
D.M.’s complaint, and is now serving a 327-year prison term.72 In January
2015, D.M. reached an out-of-court settlement with the police for
$150,000.73
Sara Reedy, D.M., and Patty were fortunate in the sense that their
rapists were ultimately identified and prosecuted, revealing that they had
been telling the truth all along. Reedy and D.M. were vindicated because
other police forces continued to investigate their rapes and ultimately iden-
tified the perpetrators even while the local force focused on prosecuting the
victims. Patty was vindicated when DNA collected from her home was
matched to her rapist several years after the assault.74 In light of how fre-
quent rape investigation failures are, we must ask how many survivors of
rape are prosecuted for false reporting and subsequently never succeed in
clearing their names because the police have stopped looking for their
attackers.
II. A FALSE REPORT, OR A DISBELIEVED RAPE COMPLAINANT? THE
IMPORTANCE OF BEST PRACTICES IN RAPE INVESTIGATION
Perhaps the most significant barrier to a successful sexual assault
investigation and prosecution, and one that influences victims as
well, is the powerful and pervasive myth that most sexual assault
allegations are false.
—IACP Sexual Assault Investigation Guidelines75
The rape investigation failures described in Part One mean that re-
porting a rape to the police can land genuine victims in prison—particularly
in Britain, where rape investigation failures and disbelief of victims drive
claim that the officers “put words in her mouth,” in contrast to officers’ written
reports, that state, “[b]ased on her answer and body language it was apparent D.M.
was lying about the rape.”).
71. Id.
72. O’Leary raped an Aurora woman in October 2009, attempted to assault a Lakewood
woman in July 2010, and raped a Westminster woman in August 2010. See Sara
Burnett, Serial Rapist Marc O’Leary Sentenced to 327 Years in Colorado Cases, DEN-
VER POST, Dec. 10, 2011, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_19513991.
73. Mike Carter, Lynnwood to Pay Rape Victim $150,000 in False Claim Suit, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2014, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2022669813_lawsuit
settled1xml.html.
74. LUEDERS, supra note 65, at 273.
75. IACP GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 12.
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false reporting prosecutions. At least 109 women have been prosecuted in
the last five years for making false allegations of rape.76 Ninety-eight of these
cases involved prosecutions for perverting the course of justice, which carries
a maximum sentence of life in prison.77 The following two examples illus-
trate the nature of this problem. In June 2010, Layla Ibrahim was sentenced
to three years in prison for PCOJ when police did not believe her account
of rape.78 Her case followed that of Gail Sherwood, who was sentenced to
serve a two-year prison term in March 2010 for the same crime.79 Both
cases, as discussed below, were marked by gravely deficient police investiga-
tions and a high level of police skepticism about the women’s complaints.
What sets these two cases apart from the cases of Reedy, D.M., Patty, and
Jane Doe is that their attackers have never been found.80 The police skepti-
cism of Ibrahim and Sherwood, the investigatory failures in their cases, and
the absence of safeguards ensuring that their complaints were handled ap-
propriately all cast serious doubt on the women’s convictions for PCOJ.
A. The IACP Best Practice Guidelines
To demonstrate this point, this Part analyzes several false reporting
prosecutions in light of the best practices in rape investigation promulgated
by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (“IACP”) (the “IACP
Guidelines”).81 As a leader in changing poor practices in sexual assault inves-
tigation, the IACP has developed robust training materials and guidance on
sexual assault investigation.82 These materials represent sophisticated think-
76. Sandra Laville, 109 Women Prosecuted for False Rape Claims in Five Years, Say Cam-
paigners, GUARDIAN, Dec. 1, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/dec/01/
109-women-prosecuted-false-rape-allegations.
77. Id. See also Guidance for Charging: Perverting the Course of Justice and Wasting Police
Time in Cases Involving Allegedly False Allegations of Rape and/or Domestic Abuse,
CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE ¶ 28, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/per-
verting_the_course_of_justice_-_rape_and_dv_allegations/
#a09%20(last%20visited%20Aug.%204,%202015 (last visited Aug. 4, 2015) (“Per-
verting the course of justice is a serious offence.”).
78. See Simon Hattenstone & Afua Hirsch, Layla’s Story: Jailed after Reporting a Sexual
Assault, GUARDIAN, Aug. 12, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/aug/12/
layla-jailed-after-reporting-sexual-assault.
79. Steven Morris, Jailed for Crying Rape: Fantasist or Genuine Victim?, GUARDIAN (UK),
Mar. 9, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/mar/09/gail-sherwood-jailed-
campaigners.
80. Which should not be surprising, because the police made very little effort to look for
them.
81. See generally IACP GUIDELINES, supra note 15 (addressing field investigative proce-
dures and best practices for working with victims of criminal sexual violence).
82. Most of these materials are available free of charge on the IACP website, so cost
should not be a factor in accessing best practices. See, e.g., IACP GUIDELINES, supra
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ing about sexual assault from multiple experts and they are designed to
greatly strengthen law enforcement’s response to such crimes83 Many of the
principles found in the IACP materials have contributed to significant im-
provements in the police response to sexual assault in U.S. cities including
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Austin, Texas, Kansas City, Missouri, and
Grand Rapids, Michigan.84 Human Rights Watch relied on IACP materials
for the recommendations in their 2013 report, Improving Police Response to
Sexual Assault.85 In addition, the Missoula Police Department, in its 2013
agreement with the Department of Justice, agreed to adopt many compo-
nents of the IACP model sexual assault policy.86
The IACP Guidelines set out detailed procedures for investigating
rape, and they do not condone charging rape complainants with false re-
porting.87 The Guidelines are also designed to minimize the chances that
police will incorrectly dismiss complaints as false, requiring that police com-
note 15; IACP, POLICE RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, http://
www.theiacp.org/Police-Response-to-Violence-Against-Women (last visited July 28,
2015); IACP, INVESTIGATING SEXUAL ASSAULTS PART I: ELEMENTS OF SEXUAL AS-
SAULT & INITIAL RESPONSE (TRAINING KEY #571) (2004), http://www.theiacp.org/
portals/0/pdfs/571InvestigatingSexualAssaultsPart1.pdf; IACP, INVESTIGATING SEX-
UAL ASSAULTS PART II: INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES (TRAINING KEY #572) (2004),
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/572InvestigatingSexualAssaultsPart2.pdf;
IACP, INVESTIGATING SEXUAL ASSAULTS PART III: INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGY &
PROSECUTION (TRAINING KEY #573) (2004) http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/
573InvestigatingSexualAssaultsPart3.pdf; IACP, IACP SEXUAL ASSAULT INCIDENT
REPORTS: INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGIES, http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/Sexu-
alAssaultGuidelines.pdf [hereinafter IACP INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGIES]; IACP,
TRAUMA INFORMED SEXUAL ASSAULT INVESTIGATION TRAINING, http://
www.theiacp.org/Trauma-Informed-Sexual-Assault-Investigation-Training; IACP,
SEXUAL ASSAULT INCIDENT REPORTS: TIPS, http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/
IACP_SexAssaultRpt_TIPScard.pdf; IACP, INVESTIGATING SEXUAL ASSAULTS:
MODEL POLICY (2005) (on file with author).
83. For instance, End Violence Against Women International is one of the expert organi-
zations that has substantially contributed to the IACP materials. See generally END
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN INTERNATIONAL, http://www.evawintl.org (last visited
Aug. 2, 2015).
84. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IMPROVING POLICE RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ASSAULT
3–4 (2013), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/improvingSAInvest_0.pdf
[hereinafter IMPROVING POLICE RESPONSE] (“Experts and detectives in each of the
cities we researched repeatedly stressed the importance of a victim-centered ap-
proach . . .”) (hereinafter IMPROVING POLICE RESPONSE).
85. See generally id.
86. Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Justice and the
City of Missoula Regarding the Missoula Police Department’s Response to Sexual
Assault, supra note 56 at 1–3.
87. See generally IACP GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 2.
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ply with three protocols before reaching such a conclusion.88 First, police
must fully investigate the sexual assault complaint.89 Second, they must ob-
tain evidence demonstrating that no sexual assault was committed or at-
tempted.90 And third, they must ensure that they do not rely on the victim’s
post-assault behavior in determining the report is false.91 These points are
expanded below.
The first protocol is that no report can be labeled false without first
completing a thorough investigation:
The determination that a report of sexual assault is false can be
made only if the evidence establishes that no crime was commit-
ted or attempted. This determination can be made only after a
thorough investigation. This should not be confused with an in-
vestigation that fails to prove a sexual assault occurred. In that
case the investigation would be labeled unsubstantiated (empha-
sis in the original).92
The second protocol is that a report cannot be categorized as false
unless, as stated above, the evidence establishes that “no crime was commit-
ted or attempted.”
The determination that a report is false must be supported by evi-
dence that the assault did not happen (emphasis in the original).93
The third protocol indicates that investigators must not rely on the
victim’s post-assault behavior to conclude that a report of a sexual assault is
false, because a victim’s reaction to sexual assault can easily be misinter-
preted.94 Some cases are improperly labeled as false because officers base
their assessment on the victim’s behavior rather than on investigative facts.
In particular, there are a number of post-assault behaviors and reactions
exhibited by victims which research has demonstrated are realistic, common
reactions to sexual assault.95 These behaviors include, among others, a delay
88. IACP GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 2–3. The IACP Guidelines provide in-depth
and detailed guidance, however, this analysis focuses on the application of just three
protocols taken from the guidance in order to craft an analysis within the constraints
of a law review article.
89. Id. at 1.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id. at 1.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 5.
95. Id.
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in reporting the sexual assault, discrepancies in the victim’s story, the vic-
tim’s uncertainty of events, and recantation by the victim.96 According to
the IACP, such behaviors “should not be seen as a basis for labeling a sexual
assault report as false (or baseless) and, therefore, as never having hap-
pened . . . . Even if aspects of the victim’s account . . . are missing, exagger-
ated, or false, this does not automatically imply that the sexual assault did
not occur.”97
When followed, the IACP Guidelines serve as an essential safeguard
for victims, ensuring that police follow correct procedures when investigat-
ing rape and before labeling a report as false. The analysis that follows dem-
onstrates that police often decide rape reports are false in circumstances
where the investigation has not followed best practice, and, accordingly,
where the IACP Guidelines would not have permitted the report to be la-
beled as false. That was the dynamic behind the Reedy, D.M., and Patty
cases, where a genuine victim was charged with false reporting. It is similarly
the dynamic behind several other cases, including those of Layla Ibrahim
and Gail Sherwood, where the perpetrator has not been identified. Accord-
ingly, there is strong reason to be skeptical of the police’s premature conclu-
sion that complainants such as Ibrahim and Sherwood were not genuine
victims.
B. Failure to Use Best Practice: the Case of Layla Ibrahim
Layla Ibrahim, of Carlisle, England, reported a rape to the police in
January 2009.98 She told investigators that as she was walking home late one
night after being out with friends, two young men sprang out of the dark-
ness and attacked her.99 They left her with several injuries later documented
by physicians, including a concussion resulting from a blow to the back of
her head, swelling in the same area, injuries to her breasts, cuts on her knee,
and a black eye.100 She also sustained injuries that caused vaginal bleeding,
and some of her clothing was torn.101
At first Ibrahim had the impression that the police were being diligent
and meticulous as they took her report, but about two weeks into the inves-
tigation she noticed that their approach had changed and they seemed to be
investigating her.102 They drew attention to what they felt were inconsisten-
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2.
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cies in her account and gaps in her memory of the attack, and they chided
her about other aspects of her account, such as her statement that her mo-
bile phone battery was dead at the time of the attack.103 Seemingly most
important, they were suspicious of the fact that she stated that she had tried
to defend herself with a pair of blunt scissors, which the attackers had ap-
parently used to cut off some of her hair.104 The police were suspicious
because the scissors contained Ibrahim’s DNA, and they argued that
Ibrahim had deliberately cut herself with the scissors to stage the attack.105
But according to Ibrahim, “of course my DNA was on the scissors—they
are my scissors.”106
Ibrahim was ultimately convicted of perverting the course of justice
and sentenced to three years in prison, despite some very compelling evi-
dence that she was a genuine rape victim.107 First, there were the numerous
physical injuries physicians documented, including genital injuries involving
damage to the perineum and bruising on the hymen.108 Moreover, police
initially recovered male blood from the crime scene, and a blond male pubic
hair from Ibrahim’s body.109 In addition, Ibrahim had five expert witnesses
testify at her trial in her defense.110 One of these was a police-employed
physician who conducted sexual assault examinations for the police and tes-
tified that Ibrahim had indeed been sexually assaulted.111
Another disturbing feature of the prosecution of Ibrahim was the exis-
tence of many police failures to investigate her rape complaint. Although
the blond pubic hair was one of the most compelling pieces of evidence of
the attack, Ibrahim later learned that it had been destroyed in the forensics
lab.112 The police were also dismissive of the male blood found at the crime
scene because, they said, it did not match anything in the DNA database.113
They did not seem to consider that it was clear evidence corroborating
Ibrahim’s account, and that she had described her attackers as young, and
therefore perhaps without a history of other offenses. Police also failed to







109. Ibrahim is dark-haired, so the fact that this pubic hair was blond and was identified
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cluded a shoe, leggings, and a bra containing blood—all of which had likely
come into contact with the assailants.115 Police also failed to investigate links
between the assault on Ibrahim and other attacks in the area, despite a strik-
ing similarity between the description she gave of one of her attackers and
that of a suspect in the other attacks.116
Applying the IACP Guidelines to Ibrahim’s case reveals severe short-
comings in how the police handled her complaint. The first step in the
protocol requires police to conduct a full investigation before determining
that a report is false, and police clearly did not complete this step in
Ibrahim’s case. As indicated above, they failed to send several articles of
clothing to be tested for DNA, failed to follow up with a key suspect lead,
and failed to investigate linkages to other cases. Moreover, a forensics lab
destroyed a crucial piece of evidence—a pubic hair from the assailant. These
shortcomings are compelling evidence that the police did not thoroughly
investigate Ibrahim’s case.
The second protocol requires police to obtain evidence that an assault
did not happen. Simply put, there was no evidence in this case that Ibrahim
was not assaulted, and plenty of evidence—including serious physical inju-
ries—that she was. On what basis, then, did police conclude that she was
lying? Keir Starmer, the Director of Public Prosecutions at the time, indi-
cated that the scissors containing Ibrahim’s DNA was a “crucial piece of
prosecution evidence.”117 This is despite the fact that, as Ibrahim herself
pointed out, her own scissors would logically contain her own DNA, and
the presence of such scissors at the crime scene could not possibly prove that
she was not attacked.118 In addition to the scissors, the police relied on other
circumstantial evidence that they felt suggested that Ibrahim had a motive
to fabricate an attack.119 For instance, prosecutors said that she had argued





118. Ibrahim had a long-standing habit of carrying scissors, needle, and thread with her.
Id.
119. Id.
120. This included a hearsay statement from a potentially unreliable source indicating
that a friend of Ibrahim’s had refused to share a cab home with her that evening, and
that she had said to the friend, “If anything happens to me, you will be sorry.” The
statement was provided to the police by Ibrahim’s ex-boyfriend, whose motives in
conveying such information is uncertain. The friend in question, Richard Dent, did
not provide this information to the police when he was interviewed shortly after the
assault but only confirmed it more than a year later. Id. This course of events should
call into question the reliability of the information. But even if the information is
reliable, such a statement is not evidence that an assault did not happen.
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The police reliance on the presence of scissors at the crime scene and
the tomato sandwich argument demonstrate why the second protocol is
necessary. Had the police carefully considered the evidence upon which
they were relying, it should have been clear that they did not have any proof
that the assault did not happen. At most, they were engaged in conjecture—
a pet theory—that Ibrahim might have a motive to lie and the means—
scissors—with which to harm herself and then claim that she was attacked.
But there were glaring shortcomings with this explanation. Police claimed
that Ibrahim cut her hair and her knee using the scissors; they did not
attempt to argue that the scissors were responsible for her genital injuries.121
Nor could the scissors explain some of her other serious injuries, notably her
concussion, swelling to the head, and black eye. Accordingly, under the
IACP Guidelines, there was no proof that the assault did not happen.
The police approach to Ibrahim’s case also fell short of the third pro-
tocol in that the police based their conclusion that Ibrahim was lying on
some inconsistencies in Ibrahim’s account and her uncertainty of events—
reactions to sexual assault which are actually common and should not be
used to discredit victims. Inconsistencies and memory loss around a sexual
assault are common reactions that result from how the brain processes
memories of traumatic events.122 Accordingly, such inconsistencies are a
normal aspect of sexual assault reporting and should not be taken as evi-
dence that a victim is not credible. In addition, in some cases a victim ex-
periences physical trauma that interferes with her ability to give a clear and
consistent account of the assault.123 That occurred here, where Ibrahim ac-
tually experienced a blow to the head and a temporary loss of consciousness
during the attack.124 Ibrahim stated that one of her attackers “fell on top of
me, and I don’t really remember a lot after that. I woke up . . . and it hurt
down below.”125 It is striking that in a case such as this, where the victim
actually experienced a head injury and loss of consciousness, that police and
prosecutors would use her memory difficulties against her.
In short, the police handling of Ibrahim’s case fell glaringly short of all
three IACP protocols for determining whether a report of sexual assault is
false. Because investigators did not complete a full investigation, did not
have evidence that the assault did not happen, and inappropriately relied on
the victim’s reaction to the sexual assault, Ibrahim should never have been
arrested for perverting the course of justice. The evidence for such an arrest
simply did not exist. That Ibrahim was actually convicted at trial and went
121. Id.
122. IACP INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 82, at 4.
123. Id.
124. Hattenstone & Hirsch, supra note 78.
125. Id.
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to prison indicates that very severe miscarriages of justice can occur when
police and prosecutors pursue rape complainants for false reporting without
regard to best practices for such investigations.
C. Applying the IACP Guidelines to the Reedy, D.M., & Patty Cases
The rape investigation failures in Ibrahim’s case are not unique. In
fact, they closely mirror the deviation from best practice that undergirded
the charging decisions in the American cases of Sara Reedy, D.M., and
Patty—the women, discussed in Part One, who were all later confirmed to
be genuine rape victims.
1. The Case of Sara Reedy
As noted above, the first protocol of the IACP Best Practices indicates
that police must fully investigate a case before making a determination that
it is false. In Reedy’s case, police did not comply with this protocol because
there simply was no investigation into Reedy’s rape. The Appellate Court
opinion notes Detective Evanson’s “undisguised suspicion of Reedy from
practically the moment she reported the attack.”126 It also makes the dis-
turbing observation that:
Evanson’s investigation into the reported rape and robbery ap-
pears to have focused exclusively on the theory that Reedy was a
liar and a thief. The police report—and, for that matter, the
entire record—indicates that, after a brief search of the woods on
the night of the incident, Evanson and the other officers made
no effort to locate Reedy’s assailant.127
It also notes that “[a]s Reedy tells it, the night she was attacked, while
she was still in the hospital . . . and before Evanson had done any further
investigation, he called her a liar and repeatedly accused her of stealing
money from the store.”128 When Reedy began to cry as a result of Evanson’s
hostile questioning at the hospital, he told her not to bother crying because
“[your] tears aren’t going to save [you] now.”129
Because Detective Evanson did not investigate Reedy’s rape allega-
tions, there was never any opportunity to conduct a full investigation prior
to determining that her report was false, as the guidelines require. Although
Reedy went to the hospital and a rape kit was collected, it was never
126. Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2010).
127. Reedy, 615 F.3d at 217.
128. Reedy, 615 F.3d at 217.
129. Reedy, 615 F.3d at 204.
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processed, despite the fact that it contained a fingernail that could have
yielded DNA from the rapist.130 Instead of investigating the rape, Evanson
immediately began investigating Reedy and preparing to bring charges
against her for robbing the gas station and for filing a false rape report.131
His complete refusal to investigate directly contradicts the IACP Guidelines
and provides support for Carol Tracy’s observation of systemic police mis-
conduct in investigating rape.132
As to the second protocol, police clearly did not have proof that the
reported rape did not happen, because Reedy was in fact raped. Although
police did not yet have Wilbur Brown’s confession when they charged
Reedy, they could not possibly have had proof that the rape did not occur.
Why, then, did police charge Reedy? As in Ibrahim’s case, Evanson likely
approached Reedy with a pet theory that governed his decision-making.
According to Reedy’s attorney, Evanson may have been motivated by the
fact that Reedy’s then-boyfriend had had prior contact with law enforce-
ment as a suspect, and Evanson thought that the boyfriend and Reedy had a
motive for robbing the gas station—they needed money to put a deposit on
a trailer that they wanted to rent.133 Whether or not Reedy’s attorney is
correct, what is clear is that Evanson did not have any evidence that Reedy
was actually lying when he charged her. The IACP Guidelines, if properly
followed, would ensure that rape victims receive fair and unbiased treatment
even in situations such as this where an officer may have a pre-existing bias
against a victim.
As a direct result of Evanson’s failure to investigate the crime that
Reedy reported, rapist Wilbur Brown was free to continue raping. He was
caught only after raping another victim on October 13, 2004, three months
after attacking Reedy. He was ultimately convicted of raping at least ten
women and was sentenced to life in prison.134
2. The Case of D.M.
Eighteen-year-old D.M. was raped on the morning of August 11,
2008, when her assailant, later identified as Marc O’Leary, entered her
apartment through a sliding door.135 He threatened D.M. with a knife and
130. Walters, supra note 64.
131. Reedy, 615 F.3d at 204–07.
132. IACP GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 12–13; Rape in the United States Hearing, supra
note 39, at 13.
133. Telephone Interview with David Weicht, Reedy’s Attorney (Feb. 4, 2013).
134. Walters, supra note 64.
135. Carter, supra note 70; Complaint at ¶ 5, Ex. 2, Ex. 9, D.M. v. O’Leary, Case 2:13-
cv-00971 (W.D. Wash. June 6, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter D.M.
Complaint].
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used a pair of shoestrings to bind D.M.’s hands together before raping her
vaginally.136 He also dumped the contents of her purse onto her bedroom
floor and fished out her identification so that he could call her by her
name.137 D.M. reported the rape to the police immediately.138 Sergeant Ma-
son and Detective Rittgarn, two male officers, investigated the case.
a. First Protocol Violated: Failure to Investigate
As in Sara Reedy’s case, the officers did not do a full investigation
prior to charging D.M. with false reporting, thus violating the first protocol
of the IACP Guidelines. Police took an initial report from D.M. and col-
lected evidence from the crime scene and from the hospital, where D.M.
was examined immediately after the rape.139 But Mason and Rittgarn appear
to have ignored all of this evidence. Instead, they became skeptical of
D.M.’s account of the rape after they spoke with three people who stated
that they were doubtful that the rape had occurred.
The first person was an anonymous caller who called police on August
12 (the day after the rape) to state that D.M. had a past history of trying to
get attention and that the caller doubted that D.M. had been raped.140 Ma-
son felt this call was important enough to note in his report.141 On August
14, Mason spoke with two other people—a friend of D.M.’s and her foster
mother (with whom D.M. had recently argued) who also expressed doubts
that D.M. was telling the truth.142 None of these individuals were with
D.M. at the time of the rape or had first-hand knowledge, but their state-
ments emboldened Mason and Rittgarn to regard D.M. with skepticism.
As a result, and without considering any of the evidence collected
from the crime scene, Mason and Rittgarn again questioned D.M. on Au-
gust 14 and pressured her to retract the rape allegation, which she did.143
The issue of police pressuring victims to retract rape allegations will be ad-
dressed below. Here, what is important to note is that in charging D.M.
with false reporting, police turned a blind eye to striking evidence cor-
roborating D.M.’s account of her attack. First, there was a hospital report
documenting injuries to both of D.M.’s wrists as well as genital injuries
(abrasions to her labia minora) immediately after the rape.144 Mason’s and
136. Carter, supra note 70; D.M. Complaint, supra note 135, at ¶ 19–20, Ex.2, Ex. 9.
137. D.M. Complaint, supra note 135, at Ex. 9.
138. Id. at Ex. 2, 5.
139. Id. at Ex. 1, Ex. 2, Ex. 7.
140. Id. at ¶ 31, Ex.2.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at ¶ 36–54.
144. Id. at Ex. 7.
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Rittgarn’s reports make no mention of this medical evidence; in fact, Ritt-
garn’s report disregards this evidence because it states that Rittgarn did not
notice any marks on her wrists when he looked at them on August 11.145
This observation would appear to be contradictory in light of the hospital
report indicating that trauma to both wrists was documented and photo-
graphed at the hospital.146
In addition, the Crime Scene Technician Report written by Detective
Miles noted that a wooden enclosure which surrounded D.M.’s back porch
was covered with dirt and debris but that “there was an area about 3 feet
wide that did not have any dirt or debris. It looked as if someone had wiped
the dirt/debris off by climbing over the top of the enclosure.”147 Detective
Miles took into evidence a number of other items that corroborated D.M.’s
account of the rape, including a shoestring tied to a pair of underwear
which had been used to gag D.M., a large kitchen knife laying next to the
bed that the rapist had used to threaten D.M., and a pair of scissors that
D.M. had used to cut the shoestring binding her wrists.148
The reports written by Mason and Rittgarn make no mention of any
of this compelling evidence, nor do they give any record of these officers
questioning D.M. about these items, about specific details of the rape, or
about her state of mind during the rape.149 In short, not only did Rittgarn
and Mason fail to complete a full investigation of the rape, they also disre-
garded compelling evidence that a rape had in fact occurred.
b. Second Protocol Violated: No Evidence the Rape Did Not Happen
As in Reedy’s case, Mason and Rittgarn’s actions were not in compli-
ance with the second protocol of the IACP Guidelines because they did not
have any evidence that the rape did not happen, and in fact they disregarded
compelling evidence that it did occur. The IACP Guidelines state that an
allegation can be determined to be false only when the police obtain evi-
dence that no crime occurred. But Mason and Rittgarn acted without this
proof. Just three days after D.M. was raped, the investigators abandoned
any effort to complete the rape investigation and instead focused their effort
on building a case that D.M. was lying about the rape. To do so, they used
her post-rape behavior to discredit her, which is exactly what the third pro-
tocol of the IACP Guidelines is designed to prevent.
145. Id. at Ex. 10.
146. Id. at Ex. 7.
147. Id. at Ex. 1.
148. Id.
149. Id. at Ex. 2, Ex. 10, Ex. 14.
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c. Third Protocol Violated: Grounding Conclusions in Victim’s
Reaction to Sexual Assault Rather than in Investigative Facts
The IACP Guidelines note the type of investigatory error that the
officers made: “some cases may be improperly labeled as false because they
are not grounded in investigative facts, but rather in the particular reactions
of the victim.”150 Rittgarn’s and Mason’s conclusion that D.M. was lying
was directly tied to how they judged her behavior, and not to any facts that
proved that the rape did not occur, as these excerpts from Rittgarn’s report
show:
. . . Based on her answers and body language it was apparent that
[D.M.] was lying about the rape. . . .
. . . Based on numerous interviews with other victims, to include
rape victims, it was apparent that [D.M.] was continuously lying
about this event. . . .
. . . Based on our interview with [D.M.] and the inconsistencies
found by Sgt. Mason in some of the statements we were confi-
dent that [D.M.] was now telling us the truth that she had not
been raped. . . .151
Mason’s report also demonstrates that he questioned D.M.’s credibil-
ity because she did not behave in the way that he seemed to think a rape
victim should behave:
. . . [D.M.] made statements that she had believed the rape hap-
pened instead of stating the rape absolutely happened. . . .152
. . . Detective Rittgarn told [D.M.] there were certain eviden-
tiary issues that did not support her story. [D.M.] did not ques-
tion what Detective Rittgarn had said and she did not adamantly
say the incident had occurred. [D.M.] instead sat quietly and
looked at the table not making eye contact with myself or Detec-
tive Rittgarn. . . .153
Mason’s first statement has him splitting hairs between whether a rape
“happened” or whether it “absolutely happened,” while the second reveals
an expectation that a real rape victim would respond in just one way to a
150. IACP GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 13.
151. D.M. Complaint, supra note 135, at Ex. 10.
152. Id. at Ex. 2.
153. Id.
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challenge from a skeptical officer—with a confident and assertive declara-
tion. Rittgarn also criticized D.M. for not being more assertive:
. . . Sgt. Mason explained to her that there were some inconsis-
tencies with her statement and the evidence to support her story.
Rather than take a stand and demand that she had been raped,
[D.M.] told us that she didn’t know why [the officers thought
there were inconsistencies]. . . .154
It appears that these officers had not received training addressing the
fact that rape victims have experienced tremendous trauma and may re-
spond to police questioning in many different ways, including by having
fears about being disbelieved.155 Female victims may also find it extremely
painful and humiliating to discuss a sexual assault with two skeptical male
officers, particularly with no support person present.156
A bit later, D.M. did in fact become more assertive, with Rittgarn’s
report stating that she “became more animated, pounded the table and said
that she was ‘pretty positive that it happened.’”157 But rather than take this
assertion as an indication of her credibility, Rittgarn responded with further
hairsplitting and skepticism: “I asked her if she was ‘pretty’ positive or actu-
ally positive. . . .”158 Three days later, D.M. told the officers she wanted to
take a polygraph to demonstrate that she was being truthful.159 Rittgarn’s
response was hostile: “I told [D.M.] that if she took a polygraph and failed
then I would book her into jail.”160 That response was enough to deter her.
Rittgarn and Mason also relied on supposed inconsistencies in D.M.’s
account to justify their disbelief, but as D.M.’s attorney points out, these
alleged inconsistencies were nothing more than “the difference between the
unfounded speculations and conjecture” that D.M. had made up the story,
154. Id. at Ex. 10 (Detective Rittgarn’s Report, dated Aug. 15, 2008).
155. DC REPORT, supra note 15. See IACP GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 7 (describing
how victims of sexual assault may delay any reports to the police due to a fear of
being doubted by investigators).
156. IACP INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 82, at 4 (inferring that allowing a
victim to have a support person present at the time of a police investigation may help
make a victim feel more willing to trust the investigators).
157. D.M. Complaint, supra note 135, at Ex. 10.
158. Id.
159. D.M. Complaint, supra note 135, at Ex. 14. Offering a polygraph is actually prohib-
ited by IACP Best Practices because doing so implies that the officers do not trust
the victim to tell the truth, and can therefore interfere with building rapport with
the victim. IACP GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 13; IACP SEXUAL ASSAULT INCI-
DENT REPORTS: INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGIES 5 (n.d.), http://www.theiacp.org/por-
tals/0/pdfs/SexualAssaultGuidelines.pdf.
160. D.M. Complaint, supra note 135, at Ex. 14.
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and D.M.’s statements to the police “corroborated by objective evidence
collected by Lynnwood Police Department and Providence Hospital on the
day of the rape.”161
In February 2011—two and a half years after raping D.M.—Marc
O’Leary was arrested in Colorado for raping at least four more women be-
tween October 2009 and January 2011.162 He was sentenced to 327 years in
prison for those rapes.163 Had the Lynnwood police actually investigated
D.M.’s rape rather than prosecuting her, they might have caught O’Leary
before he committed additional rapes in Colorado. These tragic conse-
quences could have been avoided had police followed the IACP Guidelines
and fully investigated D.M.’s complaint.
3. The Case of “Patty”
The investigation into Patty’s case was marked by a set of missteps
very similar to those in D.M.’s case, with police concluding that Patty’s
report was false without fully investigating her case and without evidence
that the rape did not happen.164 Police also misinterpreted Patty’s post-rape
behavior, contrary to the third protocol of the IACP Guidelines.
Patty, a visually impaired woman, was raped when an unknown man
entered her home in Madison, Wisconsin, in September 1997. Her rapist
was later identified as Joseph Bong.165 Just one month after reporting the
attack, Detective Tom Woodmansee accused Patty of lying about the rape
and pressured her to recant.166 She did recant, although she immediately
retracted her recantation and went back to her original account once she
was no longer in police custody.167 Four months later, she was formally
charged with obstruction of a police officer as a result of her withdrawing
her retraction statement, insisting that she was in fact raped, and com-
plaining to Woodmansee’s superior that he had pressured her to recant.168
161. Id. at ¶ 57.
162. Sarah Burnett, Serial Rapist Sentenced to 327 Years in Prison for Colorado Rapes, THE
DENVER POST (Dec. 10, 2011, 10:00 AM MST), http://www.denverpost.com/
ci_19513991.
163. Id.
164. LUEDERS, supra note 65, at 53–54, 239–41, 250–51, 272.
165. Id. at 193.
166. Id. at 58–63.
167. Id. at 58–63, 66–72.
168. Id. at 271. On October 22, 1997, The Wisconsin State Journal ran an article, based
on a police department press release, saying that a woman who had reported being
raped had later admitted to lying. This article prompted Patty to write to Woodman-
see’s supervisor, complaining that Woodmansee had compelled her to recant. The
supervisor gave Patty’s correspondence to Woodmansee, who, just two days later,
forwarded Patty’s case file to the Dane County District Attorney’s Office, recom-
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As in the cases of Reedy and D.M., police did not conduct a full
investigation of the rape prior to determining that her report of rape was
false.169 Most critically, the evidence that police collected from Patty’s home
after the rape included a bedsheet that contained the rapist’s semen.170
However this bedsheet was not subjected to DNA testing until nearly nine
months after police pressured Patty to retract her rape allegation: even then it
was only tested at the insistence of Patty’s attorney.171
As with the Reedy and D.M. cases, the police had no evidence proving
the rape did not happen, since Patty was in fact raped. What Detective
Woodmansee relied on in choosing to believe the report was false was a
series of misinterpreted behaviors—a reliance which was unwarranted under
the IACP Guidelines. Woodmansee believed Patty was too calm after the
attack; for instance, she sounded very calm on the telephone when she
called 911 to report the rape. In his view, a “real” rape victim would have
been much more distraught than Patty appeared to be.172 The IACP Guide-
lines caution police to recognize the impact of trauma on the behavior of
rape victims.173 People react differently to trauma, and the presence or ab-
sence of emotion is not an indicator of whether a report is legitimate.174
Woodmansee’s skepticism was therefore misplaced.
Police were also skeptical of apparent inconsistencies in Patty’s account
and the fact that she remembered different details of the attack at different
times. For instance, at some point after first reporting the rape, Patty was
brushing her hair and several large clumps fell out.175 When that occurred,
she remembered that the suspect had grabbed her hair and pulled her head
down towards his crotch.176 At her rapist’s trial, the defense criticized Patty
for not mentioning this detail to the police.177 But this criticism was unwar-
ranted. The IACP Guidelines indicate that victims may experience “diffi-
culty remembering all the details of the sexual assault due to traumatic
mending that Patty be prosecuting for obstructing an officer. Patty was charged with
obstruction on February 9, 1998. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 272.
172. Id. at 14. Patty indicated that she made an effort to stay calm in order to help her
18-year-old daughter, who was extremely distressed upon learning that her mother
had been raped. Id.
173. IACP INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGIES supra note 82, at 4 (undated), http://
www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/SexualAssaultGuidelines.pdf.
174. Id.
175. LUEDERS, supra note 65, at 23.
176. Id. at 23–24.
177. Id. at 233; see id. at 52 & 59 for fuller discussion of police skepticism of Patty’s
account because of perceived inconsistencies.
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response. This does not mean they are lying or leaving out details intention-
ally. Often with time and as trauma recedes, details will emerge.”178
In short, police determined that Patty was a liar without fully investi-
gating her case, without evidence that the assault did not happen, and by
relying on behaviors that were part of Patty’s reaction to the rape trauma
and that should not have been used against her. It was only after the DNA
testing was performed on her bedsheet that the district attorney decided to
drop the obstruction case against her, indicating that the state could not
prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that Patty had lied about the attack.179
Patty succeeded in getting police to reopen the rape investigation, but her
rapist was not identified until June of 2001, due to a delay in getting his
DNA into a federal DNA data bank.180
The DNA identification of Bong as Patty’s rapist proved that Patty
had been truthful all along and that the police had failed her miserably.
Bong was convicted of rape in 2004 and sentenced to fifty years in
prison.181 In 2006 the Madison City Council issued a formal apology to
Patty and offered her a $35,000 settlement, calling her ordeal “one of the
most enormous, colossal failures the city has perpetrated.”182
D. The Case of Gail Sherwood
Gail Sherwood is another example of a disbelieved rape complainant
who was prosecuted in Britain despite grave deficiencies in the investigation
into her complaints. Sherwood first came to the attention of her local
Gloucestershire police in March of 2008, when she sought help after a man,
who had been stalking her for six months, escalated his pursuit and chased
her in his vehicle.183 Over the next month, the stalker’s pursuit of Sherwood
further escalated, with Sherwood calling the police several times in a
178. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 173.
179. LUEDERS, supra note 65, at 272.
180. Id. at 272–273.




183. Detective Sergeant John Wood, Statement of Witness (Nov. 24, 2008) (on file with
author). Sherwood’s stalker has never been identified, nor does she recognize him as
an acquaintance.
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panic.184 The stalker raped Sherwood twice—on April 25 and June 1—
before the police arrested her for lying.185
On both occasions, police found Sherwood in a secluded, wooded
area, naked from the waist down, with her hands tied tightly together and
secured to a fence.186 She reported that the June 1 incident began when the
assailant broke into her home in the early hours of the morning, delivered a
blow to her head which rendered her unconscious, and abducted her in her
own car.187 After both attacks, Sherwood had genital injuries consistent
with sexual assault as well as other injuries, such as scratches and bruises,
consistent with the harrowing account of rape that she gave.188 Police also
noted that she was extremely distressed.189
Despite this evidence, police did not believe that Sherwood was telling
the truth and accused her of faking both rapes for attention-seeking pur-
184. Id. One of the most frightening events occurred on the night of April 9, 2008, when
Sherwood heard noises coming from the downstairs of her home while she was in
bed upstairs. Going down to investigate, Sherwood found a man dressed in motorcy-
cle gear standing in her living room. He said to her, “don’t worry, it’s not tonight,
but I just had to see you and hear your voice.” He then turned and left through a
patio door. Sherwood called the police, and a responding officer noted in his report
that Sherwood was shaking with fear when he arrived. Mark Moody, Statement of
Witness (Dec. 7, 2009) (noting that Sherwood was “very distressed; I could see that
she was physically shaking”) (on file with author).
185. Detective Sergeant John Wood, Statement of Witness (Dec. 7, 2009) (on file with
author). As discussed infra, Sherwood was raped again by the same man after her
arrest, on September 4, 2008, and again in December 2013. Record of Tape Re-
corded Interview by Detective Sergeant Adrian Stratton with Gail Sherwood, Stroud
Police Station (Oct. 30, 2008) (on file with author); Interview with Gail Sherwood,
Stroud, U.K. (Jan. 25, 2014).
186. Detective Sergeant John Wood, Restricted Information Form (Nov. 24, 2008) (on
file with author); Letter from Gail Sherwood, supra note 5, at 9, 19.
187. Detective Chief Inspector Paul Shorrock, Statement of Witness (October 27, 2008)
(on file with author); Letter from Gail Sherwood, supra note 5, at 17.
188. Information Form for the Examination of the Complainant, Victim: Gail Sherwood,
signed by Dr. [signature illegible] (Apr. 26, 2008) (indicating numerous scratches
and bruises which could be consistent with allegation of assault and one centimeter
square area of redness and tenderness near the vaginal opening); Patient Record of
Mrs. Gail Elizabeth Sherwood, Beeches Green Surgery, (clinical data from Mar. 1,
2008–Oct. 23, 2014) (indicating the following observations on Apr. 28, 2008:
Raped; Examination: superficial cuts to forarms [sic] and marks to wrists; visible hit
on head; has other wounds all photographed Saturday at police station; and the
following on June 11, 2008: noted injuries to right breast and to vagina) (on file
with author).
189. Gloucestershire Constabulary Initial Investigation Proforma, Victim: Gail Elizabeth
Sherwood (n.d.) (noting date of incident is Apr. 25, 2008 and that victim was “very
shakey” and “cold”) (on file with author).
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poses.190 She was arrested for perverting the course of justice on June 18,
2008, just seventeen days after she reported the second rape.191 Sherwood
was shocked by these accusations. She was around fifty years old, a mother
with three daughters, and had a full life with her children, a partner, and
two businesses breeding dogs and caring for children in her own home.192
She had no history of mental illness.193 Nevertheless, she was charged with
three counts of PCOJ, convicted by a jury on all three counts, and sen-
tenced to two years in prison.194
An analysis of Sherwood’s case against the IACP Guidelines reveals
many shortcomings in the police’s approach to her case. Police failed to
comply with the first protocol—doing a full investigation prior to deter-
mining that a report is false. These failures are quite striking, and very much
related to the deep skepticism that police showed toward Sherwood from
the outset of their contact with her. Police were skeptical of Sherwood’s
account of several stalking incidents even before the April 25 rape oc-
curred.195 Because they did not believe her, they failed to take all possible
investigatory steps once she reported the rape. The officers’ own records
document the fact that they approached Sherwood with disbelief from the
earliest stages of the investigation.
For example, Detective Inspector Ginn’s diary documents that police
expressed skepticism from within hours of rescuing Sherwood.196 His 3:00
190. Morris, Jailed for Crying Rape, supra note 79; John Wood, Restricted Information
Form (Nov. 24, 2008) (on file with author).
191. See Detective Sergeant John Wood, Statement of Witness (Dec. 7, 2009) (on file
with author).
192. Morris, Jailed for Crying Rape, supra note 79; Interview with Gail Sherwood, Stroud,
U.K. (Jan. 25, 2014).
193. Patient Record of Mrs. Gail Elizabeth Sherwood, Beeches Green Surgery (clinical
data from Mar. 1, 2008–Oct. 23, 2014) (showing an absence of any reference what-
soever to any mental illness) (on file with author).
194. Morris, Jailed for Crying Rape, supra note 79.
195. In mid-April, Sherwood was at the police station and told Detective Wood that she
overheard a junior officer—Carnie—make pejorative comments about Sherwood’s
mental health. Detective Sergeant John Wood, Statement of Witness (October 27,
2009). As Wood reported it, Carnie stated that there “wasn’t a shred of evidence”
regarding suspects for Sherwood’s stalking claims, that Sherwood may be “para-
noid,” that it could be “in her head” and that she may be having “some kind of
mental breakdown.” Id. Wood’s report notes that he apologized to Sherwood for
Carnie’s statements but that he also stated to her that “a potential reason for these
comments was because the police had to cover all aspects of an investigation and test
the veracity of Mrs. Sherwood’s account and that this was a genuine line of enquiry.”
Id.
196. See Detective Inspector Ginn, Criminal Investigation Division, Diary (Apr. 26,
2008) (on file with author) (“given doubt about [Sherwood’s] account of
events. . . .”).
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a.m. diary entry on April 26 indicates that he had requested that her home
be searched “for any physical evidence that might suggest her direct involve-
ment and that this has been planned and done by herself, to herself.”197
This skepticism continued to grow over the next several hours. Ginn’s 6:00
a.m. diary entry notes that two other detectives who had had contact with
Sherwood were “skeptical of her initial account, stating anomalies are pre-
sent.”198 Ginn did not give additional details, but any anomalies were likely
the typical discrepancies that are common when a person affected by a trau-
matic event tries to give an account of her experience. As such, using them
to conclude that Sherwood was lying would have contravened the third
protocol of the IACP Guidelines and suggests a lack of understanding about
the impact that trauma has on human behavior.199
Ginn’s diary further indicates that police allowed their skepticism of
Sherwood to influence the investigation of her case. For instance, on the
morning of April 26—the day after the rape—a question had arisen as to
whether the crime scene should be searched by a specialist police search
advisor or whether that task should be left to ordinary detectives.200 Ginn
decided to leave it to the ordinary detectives, indicating that “given the
flaws in Sherwood’s account” he did not consider it “proportionate” to call
in the specialist search advisor on the weekend.201 The decision not to call
in a search advisor was crucial, because it meant that the police were not
making their best effort to search and secure evidence from the scene.
Later that day when the BBC expressed interest in giving press cover-
age to the case, Ginn declined to share details, stating that “given the flaws
in [Sherwood’s] account I am keen to downplay the matter so as not to
falsely raise fear of crime.”202 But by not releasing a description of the sus-
pect to the general public, the police reduced their chances of apprehending
the rapist. Accordingly, police skepticism impeded the investigation into
Sherwood’s first rape report and might have contributed to her being raped
a second time.
The June 1 rape investigation was marred by even more serious fail-
ures than the first investigation. A great deal of evidence was recovered from
the crime scene and sent for forensic testing.203 Police knew that it took
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. IACP INVESTIGATIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 82, at 5 (n.d.), http://
www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/SexualAssaultGuidelines.pdf
200. Detective Inspector Ginn, Criminal Investigation Department, Diary (Apr. 26,
2008) (on file with author).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Detective Inspector Glenn McGlade, Statement of Witness (Dec. 22, 2009) (on
file with author) (citing and including Exhibit GM3, an email from McGlade to
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about six weeks to get test results back from the laboratory, as they had not
received the results from the April 25 rape until early June.204 However,
their knowledge of the time frame did not stop them from treating Sher-
wood as a suspect for PCOJ beginning on June 9, just eight days after the
rape, and several weeks before any forensic test results would have been
available.205 Accordingly, police did not consider all the evidence in Sher-
wood’s case before charging her, and her complaints were therefore treated
as false without a full investigation.
The second protocol of the IACP Guidelines requires police to have
evidence that each rape did not happen. The police based their false report-
ing case against Sherwood on one key piece of evidence which does not
satisfy this criterion.206 CCTV footage from a hidden camera that police
had trained upon Sherwood’s driveway showed just one individual getting
into the driver’s seat of Sherwood’s car at 1:38 a.m. on June 1 (the night of
the reported abduction) and then driving the car out of the camera’s
range.207 Police used this piece of footage to develop their pet theory: that
the driver of the car was Sherwood, and that she was therefore lying about
being raped and stalked.208
There are three problems with this conclusion. First, the footage was
of extremely poor quality because the camera was not designed for use in
low light conditions.209 Consequently, it was impossible to see the person
Detective Chief Inspector Paul Shorrock on June 2, 2008, listing evidence seized on
June 1, 2008 and outlining the suggested forensic strategy).
204. See Officers Report from Detective Constable Claire Hudman to Detective Sergeant
John Wood (June 13, 2008) (on file with author) (noting that Hudman had ob-
tained forensic test results between June 10 and 12, 2008, for items sent for testing
after the April 25, 2008, rape at Haresfield Beacon).
205. See Detective Chief Inspector Paul Shorrock, Statement of Witness (October 27,
2008) (on file with author); Operation Whitney Interview Strategy, Gloucestershire
Constabulary (on file with author).
206. Police also relied on a confession that was obtained from Sherwood at the police
station, under duress. Interview by Detective Sergeant Adrian Stratton with Gail
Sherwood, supra note 185. The issue of police placing pressure upon rape complain-
ants to retract allegations will be discussed infra. Here, it should suffice to note that
under the IACP Guidelines, a retraction should not be used as evidence that a rape
did not happen. IACP GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 13.
207. DVD: Footage from Sherwood’s driveway in Stroud, UK (CCTV, 2008) (on file
with author). Crucially, an assailant could have driven the car out of camera range
and then loaded Sherwood into the car. Sherwood’s driveway is seventy-two feet
long; the camera picked up only the upper fourteen feet of the driveway—the por-
tion nearest the house. Id.
208. Detective Sergeant John Wood, Statement of Witness (Nov. 24, 2008) (on file with
author).
209. JONATHAN SPENCER, A REPORT ON THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE OF: REGINA V
GAIL SHERWOOD 6 (Sept. 30, 2009) (on file with author).
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entering the car with any clarity. In fact, a facial mapping expert rendered
an opinion indicating that on a scale of zero to eight, the best image of the
face fell between level one and level two, meaning that the footage “fell
grossly short of the standard necessary to demonstrate an identification.”210
The expert’s report also noted that the facial images were “of extremely poor
resolution” and “provide no information on which to base an opinion of the
driver’s sex.”211 It is striking, then, that police used this footage to conclu-
sively identify a rape victim and prosecute her for false reporting when no
other evidence supported the position that she had made a false report.
Second, even if Sherwood was the driver of the car, that fact would
not be evidence that the rapes did not happen. Video footage collected on
June 1, cannot possibly negate Sherwood’s reported rape from April 25. The
police could only arrive at that conclusion by speculating that if she lied
about the June 1 rape, she must also be lying about the April 25 rape. Such
speculation is not evidence. Moreover, the footage is also not evidence that
the June 1 rape did not happen. If Sherwood did drive the car on June 1, at
worst this would have been an inconsistency in her account, and police
would still be obligated to fully investigate the case. Furthermore, Sherwood
reported two blows to the head that night, one of which caused her to black
out and lose her memory.212 In light of these considerations, and the third
protocol’s instruction not to use discrepancies in the victim’s account as
evidence of a false report, the video footage was not sufficient evidence to
call off the investigation and label the report false.
Third, and perhaps most disturbingly, the June 1 video footage actu-
ally shows a man meeting the description of the stalker at Sherwood’s home
that evening.213 About one hour before Sherwood’s reported abduction, the
camera caught this man about fifteen feet from her home and walking to-
wards it. The footage also showed a flashlight beam being trained upon
Sherwood’s house just before the man appears. Moreover, it showed auto-
mobile headlights that were consistent with a second unknown person being
dropped off in front of Sherwood’s house at 1:00 a.m., after all family mem-
bers were home for the night.214 That footage corroborated a statement pro-
vided by a neighbor, who observed a person being dropped off at
210. Id. at 12.
211. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
212. Letter from Gail Sherwood, supra note 5, at 17.
213. Footage from Sherwood’s driveway, Stroud, UK, supra note 207. Sherwood had re-
ported that her rapist was tall and very muscular, with broad shoulders. E-mail from
Gail Sherwood to Lisa Avalos (Apr. 7, 2016, 04:29 CST) (on file with author). The
man caught on camera can only be seen from the waist up, but he has very broad
shoulders and looks quite fit. See id.
214. See id. The movement of automobile headlights caught on camera indicates that a
car stopped in front of Sherwood’s home just long enough to drop someone off. See
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Sherwood’s house at that time.215 Taken together, this evidence suggested
that two intruders might have been in the vicinity of Sherwood’s home that
night—a man who arrived on foot around 12:34 a.m., and a second person
that was dropped off around 1:00 a.m. and spotted by a neighbor. Either
one of them could have driven Sherwood’s vehicle. Police never explored
this crucial, corroborating evidence, and they never followed up with the
neighbor.216
Sherwood was raped a third time on September 4, 2008, when the
same assailant came to her home.217 Having already been arrested for PCOJ,
Sherwood did not report this rape to the police, although a friend did so.218
Police documents demonstrate that Detective Wood decided to “no crime”
this rape report because he did not believe that the rape happened.219 Police
did not bother to interview Sherwood or attend the crime scene before
making this judgment, although Sherwood’s medical records indicate that
she still had genital injuries consistent with sexual assault five days after this
reported rape.220 Their handling of the third rape report violated all of the
IACP Guidelines discussed here, because the police conducted no investiga-
tion whatsoever before writing off the report as false.
E. “Best Practices” Analysis Reveals that Investigatory Failures Lead to
Miscarriages of Justice
The result of this analysis of five false reporting cases is both straight-
forward and disturbing. When the IACP Guidelines are applied, the false
reporting cases against all five of the women evaporate. Had best practices
been followed, none of the five would have been charged with a crime.
Ibrahim and Sherwood would never have gone to prison, because the evi-
id. Earlier footage proves that all members of Sherwood’s family were already home
for the night when these events occurred. See id.
215. See id.; Mike Jones, Statement of Witness (Jan. 8, 2009) (on file with author).
216. House to House Enquires, Gloucestershire Constabulary (June 1, 2008) (on file with
author). The House to House Enquires indicated that Mike Jones had no relevant
information, id., when in fact, he submitted a statement voluntarily with very rele-
vant information. See Jones, supra note 215.
217. Interview by Detective Sergeant Adrian Stratton with Gail Sherwood, supra note
185.
218. Id.
219. Full Incident Record From Detective Sergeant John Wood (Sept. 11, 2008) (“Due to
the on-going investigation against Mrs [sic] Sherwood for wasting police time and
perverting the course of justice the decision has been made that this will not be
crimed as we do not believe that a crime of rape has ocurred. [sic]”)
220. Patient Record of Mrs. Gail Elizabeth Sherwood, Beeches Green Surgery (clinical
data from Mar. 1, 2008–Oct. 23, 2014) (entry for 10 Sep 2008 notes “small 1/2 cm
perianal haematoma” and that “although assault was vaginal rape assailant apparently
pushed against anal area before vaginal rape”) (on file with author).
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dence marshalled against them was not sufficient to bring a false reporting
charge under the IACP Guidelines. The police evidence does not indicate
that Ibrahim and Sherwood were less truthful than the other women.
Rather, it indicates that all five cases suffered from gravely deficient investi-
gations, and that Ibrahim and Sherwood did not have the benefit of investi-
gators who continued to search for their assailants even when the original
investigators had given up.
The quick arrest of Sherwood less than three months after she first
complained about stalking strongly suggests that Sherwood’s local force was
not adequately trained to investigate this type of crime. Stalking cases can be
complex and can take substantial time to solve, as the case of a very similar
stalker, Michael McClellan, demonstrates. In that case, it took Fort Wayne,
Indiana, detective Lorrie Bandor five years of investigation in order to obtain
evidence sufficient to secure McClellan’s stalking conviction.221 Sherwood
had also been stalked for years, and this stalking culminated in rape—mak-
ing her case even more complex than the McClellan case.222 But the investi-
gation into her stalking complaints had barely scratched the surface when
police acted on their skepticism and arrested her for lying about rape just
three months after she sought their help in relation to the stalking. The
enormous contrast in the time invested in these two cases suggests an utter
failure to take Sherwood seriously.
Unfortunately, the police response to Sherwood is not unusual. A
2005 British Home Office study on attrition in rape cases clearly docu-
ments that the typical police approach to identifying supposedly false allega-
tions of rape deviates from the IACP Guidelines on a widespread and
systematic basis.223 The study found that a significant amount of attrition
occurs early in the rape investigation process, where the police dismissed
many rape complaints as false allegations shortly after they were reported,
and accordingly did not investigate them.224 This is a clear deviation from
the IACP Guidelines, because cases should never be dismissed as false allega-
tions prior to a full investigation. The practice of dismissing cases as false
221. See Jeff Neumeyer, Fort Wayne Stalking Case Gets National Publicity, ABC 21 ALIVE
(Dec. 6, 2013, 6:11 PM), http://www.21alive.com/news/local/Fort-Wayne-Stalking-
Case-Gets-National-Publicity-234810541.html. McClellan was sentenced to ten
years.
222. Police knew, in 2008, that Sherwood reported that the same man stalked her for six
months in 2000/2001 before disappearing until 2007. He has continued his stalking
campaign ever since, through 2015. Letter from Gail Sherwood to Caroline, supra
note 5; Detective Chief Inspector Paul Shorrock, Statement of Witness (Oct. 27,
2008) (on file with author); Interview with Gail Sherwood, Stroud, U.K. (Aug. 10,
2015).
223. KELLY ET AL., supra note 17, at 36–53.
224. Id. at 52.
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prior to investigating them corroborates the finding of a 2014 policing re-
port that investigatory skills are poor across many forces.225 Consequently, it
should be apparent that when police fail to follow best practice guidelines
prior to charging a rape complainant with false reporting, there is in fact a
great risk that they are charging a genuine rape victim and letting a rapist
run free.
III. THE ROLE OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT CULTURE IN FUELING
FALSE REPORTING PROSECUTIONS
This Part of the Article analyzes two additional factors that fuel the
problem of charging rape complainants with false reporting. First, a per-
formance management culture within the police affects the approach police
take to rape cases. In particular, pressure to meet performance targets incen-
tivizes police to close rape cases through improper means. Second, as a result
of these performance management pressures, police have frequently sub-
jected rape complainants to intense pressure to retract their allegations so
that police can avoid investigating the rapes and recording them as crimes.
A. Performance Management and Workload Management Strategies that
Harm Rape Complainants
It is well established that police behavior can be perversely affected by
a performance management culture that emphasizes the achievement of per-
formance targets over core policing values, such as reducing crime and pro-
tecting victims.226 Under a performance management regime, police chiefs
225. HER MAJESTY’S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY, STATE OF POLICING: THE AN-
NUAL ASSESSMENT OF POLICING IN ENGLAND AND WALES 2013/2014 30 (2014),
http://www.leics.pcc.police.uk/Document-Library/Our-Work/HMIC-Reports/
HMIC-Report-State-of-Policing-2013-2014-November-2014.pdf (finding that 18 of
43 forces need to improve their investigatory skills).
226. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SELECT COMMITTEE,
CAUGHT RED-HANDED: WHY WE CAN’T COUNT ON POLICE RECORDED CRIME
STATISTICS 14 (2014), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cm-
select/cmpubadm/760/760.pdf [hereinafter CAUGHT RED-HANDED]; Richard Al-
leyne, PCs Told to Downgrade Crimes to Help Meet Targets, THE TELEGRAPH (May 5,
2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1929667/Pcs-told-to-downgrade-
crimes-to-help-meet-targets.html; Alan Travis, Police Fail to Record 800,000 Crimes a
Year, Including One in Four Sex Offenses, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 18, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/18/police-dismiss-one-in-four-sex-
crimes-watchdog; HER MAJESTY’S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY, CRIME RE-
CORDING: A MATTER OF FACT (2014), https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/
hmic/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/crime-data-integrity-interim-report.pdf [herein-
after CRIME RECORDING: A MATTER OF FACT]. See generally RODGER PATRICK, A
TANGLED WEB: WHY YOU CAN’T BELIEVE CRIME STATISTICS (2014).
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find their performance judged according to how to well they do at reducing
crime rates.227 Performance management culture has been condemned be-
cause it creates a perverse incentive to under-record crime, because “failing
to record unsolved crimes improves the percentage of crimes detected.”228 In
other words, officers are incentivized to only record crimes that they have
actually solved.
In 2013, strong evidence emerged that British police had been deliber-
ately manipulating crime figures in order to meet performance targets, and
official investigations into these practices followed.229 These manipulations
have included downgrading reported crimes (e.g. downgrading a burglary to
“criminal damage”),230 and not recording reported crimes at all by labeling
them as “no crime” or as “crime-related incidents” (“CRIs”) when these
categories are inappropriate.231 After an investigation, authorities deter-
mined that police-recorded crime data was inaccurate.232 The UK Statistics
Authority therefore stripped this data of its National Statistics
designation.233
The police treatment of sex crimes has been particularly affected by
these poor practices. Police fail to record about twenty percent of all crime
reported to them, but twenty-six percent of reported sex offenses go unre-
corded.234 Moreover, sexual offenses are frequently “no-crimed” or recorded
as “crime-related incidents” when these latter designations are improper.235
A police inspector’s report gave numerous examples of reports of rape that
were “no-crimed” by the police when they should have been reported as
rapes.236 Retired Metropolitan Police Detective Chief Superintendent and
Force Crime Registrar Peter Barron stated that officers use the “no-crime”
and “CRI” designations with rape cases in order to help them manage their
workloads:
227. RODGER PATRICK, A TANGLED WEB, supra note 226, at 1–2.
228. Id. at 2. See also CAUGHT RED-HANDED, supra note 226, at 3.
229. CRIME RECORDING: A MATTER OF FACT, supra note 226; Alan Travis, supra note
226.
230. Richard Alleyne, supra note 226; Interview with Peter Barron, former Detective
Chief Superintendent, Metropolitan Police, London, U.K. (Dec. 12, 2014).
231. CAUGHT RED-HANDED, supra note 226, at 14. Recording an incident as “no crime”
means that an incident initially recorded as a crime was later found, upon further
investigation, not to be a crime. A “crime-related incident is one where the balance
of probabilities suggests that a crime was committed, but no victim can be found to
confirm this.” Id. at ¶ 10.
232. See generally CAUGHT RED-HANDED, supra note 226.
233. Id. at 3.
234. Id. at 16.
235. CRIME RECORDING: A MATTER OF FACT, supra note 226, at 59–62; CAUGHT RED
HANDED, supra note 226, at 14–17.
236. CRIME RECORDING: A MATTER OF FACT, supra note 226, at 15, 42, 60–62.
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Rape is a difficult crime to investigate, and it can be traumatic
for the investigators. You can only have so many rapes that you
are investigating open at one time. So one coping mechanism is
to record it as a CRI. Keep it on the back burner, but never on
the books as part of your workload.237
Accordingly, a policing culture that emphasizes performance manage-
ment creates barriers to justice for victims of sexual violence because it en-
courages police to focus on offenses that are easiest to solve and record as
crimes.238 This emphasis perversely channels resources away from more dif-
ficult crimes and investigations. For instance, during the investigation of
prolific serial rapist Kirk Reid, a supervisor requested that four additional
officers be allocated to the investigation.239 She was only given two officers,
both of whom were removed from the investigation shortly thereafter.240
This left the Reid investigation with no one actively working on it.241
When a performance management culture is coupled with the police
culture of suspicion toward rape victims, these two cultures are mutually
reinforcing. A performance management culture predisposes officers to look
for ways to avoid investigating more difficult crimes by justifying a “no-
crime” or CRI designation, such as by rationalizing a conclusion that the
complainant is lying about being raped.242 From the officer’s perspective, it
may not make sense to put resources into investigating a crime that the
237. Interview with Peter Barron, former Detective Chief Superintendent, Metropolitan
Police, London, U.K. (Dec. 12, 2014).
238. See CAUGHT RED-HANDED, supra note 226, at 78 ([C]oncerns were expressed that
the importance attached to crude detection rates were leading officers to concentrate
on ‘low-hanging fruit’, focusing unduly on offences that were easier to clear up”).
239. INDEPENDENT POLICE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION, COMMISSIONER’S REPORT:
IPCC INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE’S




241. See id. Reid was convicted of twenty-seven rapes; police think he may be responsible
for an additional one hundred attacks. Met Officers Face Sack over Failures in Kirk
Reid Investigation, THE TELEGRAPH (June 28, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/uknews/law-and-order/7859011/Met-officers-face-sack-over-failures-in-Kirk-
Reid-investigation.html.
242. This is, in part, because performance management cultures typically do not impose
performance targets on the most serious crimes, such as rape and murder, but rather
on lesser crimes. As a result, a police force can be incentivized to direct resources
away from the most serious crimes and towards crimes that are being counted for
performance management purposes. If a crime is not being counted, then there is
less incentive to solve it. Rodger Patrick has referred to this practice as “skewing.” See
generally RODGER PATRICK, A TANGLED WEB, supra note 226 at 40–45.
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officer will not get credit for solving under the targets in effect at the
time.243 This mindset then reinforces the culture of suspicion because by
disbelieving rape complainants, police can actually reduce their workloads.
Target culture thus incentivizes police to be skeptical of victims, com-
pounding the difficulties that victims face in being believed, having their
cases investigated, and obtaining justice. Target culture helps explain why
rape victims often report pressure from the police to retract their allegations.
B. Making Rape Disappear By Pressuring Victims to Retract Allegations
Pressuring victims to retract allegations of crime is a strategy that po-
lice officers have used to make crime disappear, thus allowing forces to more
easily meet performance targets. This is poor practice. According to Human
Rights Watch, experts “strenuously object to threatening victims implicitly
or explicitly with charges for false reporting.”244 Under the IACP Guide-
lines, a victim’s retraction statement should not be used as evidence that a
sexual assault did not occur.245 Despite this fact, police in both the United
States and Britain have frequently engaged in precisely this behavior, pres-
suring rape complainants —including genuine victims—to retract, and
then using that retraction as proof that no rape occurred.
Solving a sexual offense will likely take a great deal of time and investi-
gatory resources, and this investment may seem nonsensical to
overburdened officers when easier alternatives are available—namely, keep-
ing the offense off the books entirely by pressuring a victim to retract her
allegation. HRW reported several cases where Washington, D.C., police ac-
cused rape complainants of lying about being raped, including four cases
where victims were explicitly threatened with prosecution for false report-
ing.246 The pervasiveness of the practice of threatening victims with false
reporting charges suggests a systemic problem rather than the isolated ac-
tions of one or two rogue officers; as the report noted, a former rape crisis
center volunteer reported that a police detective stated, during a training for
volunteers, that “We make it very clear to survivors that there is a penalty
for false reporting” and that “[we] repeatedly remind the victim that they
cannot false report.”247
243. See Patrick, supra note 226, at 40–46; see generally CAUGHT RED-HANDED, supra
note 226, at 76–89.
244. IMPROVING POLICE RESPONSE, supra note 84, at 9.
245. IACP GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 12–13.
246. DC REPORT, supra note 15, at 128.
247. Id.
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In Britain, the same practice has been tied to the manipulation of
crime statistics.248 Peter Barron stated that the police will “often ring back
victims and begin to challenge whether or not the crime actually oc-
curred. . . .”249 They will also attempt “to persuade the victim that a less
serious crime than that originally alleged has been committed.”250 Police
also use “false reporting strategies” to encourage victim recantation and have
thus “succeeded in suppressing crime levels dramatically.”251
According to Peter Barron, rape victims face “massive” pressure to re-
tract allegations as a result of police concern with meeting performance
targets.252 A 2013 Independent Police Complains Commission (“IPCC”)
report into Metropolitan Police rape investigation practices found that pres-
sure was placed on officers to obtain retraction statements from victims be-
cause such statements benefitted the unit’s performance statistics by
enabling police to “no crime” certain rape allegations.253 Reacting to these
findings, the Public Administration Select Committee stated in 2014 that
“[a]ny instance of deliberate misrecording of sexual offences is deplorable,
but especially so if this has been brought down by means of improperly
persuading or pressurising victims into withdrawing or downgrading their
report.”254
248. See INDEPENDENT POLICE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION, SOUTHWARK SAPPHIRE
UNIT’S LOCAL PRACTICES FOR THE REPORTING AND INVESTIGATIONS OF SEXUAL
OFFENCES, JULY 2008–SEPTEMBER 2009 10–11 (2013), http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/
sites/default/files/Documents/investigation_commissioner_reports/Southwark_Sap
phire_Units_local_practices_for_the_reporting_and_investigation_of_sexual_offenc
es_july2008_sept2009.PDF [hereinafter SOUTHWARK IPCC REPORT].
249. Peter Barron, Written Evidence on Crime Statistics, CST0003, Public Administra-




251. See generally PATRICK, supra note 226, at chapter 1 (explaining how police strategies
for dealing with suspected false reports result in far fewer crimes being recorded).
252. Interview with Peter Barron, former Detective Chief Superintendent, Metropolitan
Police, in London, U.K. (Dec. 12, 2014).
253. SOUTHWARK IPCC REPORT, supra note 248, at 10–11. Officers sometimes tried to
justify these “no-crime” decisions on the basis of the victim’s mental health or simi-
lar issues of vulnerability—an approach which has caused researcher Betsy Stanko to
conclude that the rape of people with high levels of vulnerability has essentially been
decriminalized. See Melanie Newman, Rape Has Been “Decriminalised’ for the Most
Vulnerable Says Senior Met Advisor, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Feb.
28, 2014), https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/02/28/rape-has-been-
decriminalised-for-the-most-vulnerable-says-senior-met-adviser/; CAUGHT RED-
HANDED, supra note 226, at 15.
254. CAUGHT RED-HANDED, supra note 226, at 39.
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The consequences for rape complainants of the pressure—and
threats—that police place on them to retract rape allegations is evident in
the five cases discussed in-depth in this Article. Strikingly, all five of these
women —Sara Reedy, D.M., Patty, Layla Ibrahim, and Gail Sherwood—
experienced strong police pressure to retract their rape allegations. Police
actually did extract false confessions from both D.M. and Patty—proven
rape victims—as well as from Sherwood. The fact that genuine rape victims
have been coerced into giving false confessions helps to illustrate why the
IACP Guidelines do not allow police to conclude that a report is false based
on a victim’s recantation.255 If police are pressuring victims to retract allega-
tions, and victims are frightened enough to give in to the pressure and
falsely confess, then the investigatory process is tainted miserably and fails
victims. Revisiting some of these cases will demonstrate how police coerce
victims to retract rape allegations.
In Patty’s case, detective Tom Woodmansee asked her, under false pre-
tenses, to come to the station so that she could answer further questions
that would assist in the investigation into her rape claim.256 When she ar-
rived, he detained her and accused her of fabricating the rape claim.257 He
then proceeded to threaten her and exert pressure on her until he extracted a
false confession from her,258 a tactic that he had used with numerous other
possible crime victims.259 Patty recanted because “if she didn’t admit to
making this up, she could never again expect police to believe her or to
come to her assistance in a time of a need.”260 She later set the record
straight, writing: “Have you asked the detectives in this case why I suddenly
changed my mind and said I made it up? . . . I was interrogated for two
hours in a closed room, without any possibility of leaving unless I said it did
not happen.”261
Similarly, in the case of D.M., two male police officers in Washington
state lured her to the police station under false pretenses, telling her that
they needed her to answer further questions to aid the rape investigation.262
Upon arrival at the station, the officers accused D.M. of lying about the
255. IACP GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 13.
256. LUEDERS, supra note 65, at 56–57 (telling Patty he wanted to meet in order to
acquire additional hair samples when in fact he planned to accuse her of false
reporting).
257. Id. at 58.
258. See id. at 58–63.
259. See id. at 32–34.
260. Id. at 60–61.
261. LUEDERS, supra note 65, at 69. This quotation comes from a letter Patty wrote to
local newspaper, explaining herself and criticizing their decision to run an article
saying that she admitted to lying about rape. Id. at 68–69.
262. See D.M. Complaint, supra note 135, at 10.
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rape, repeatedly expressed their skepticism of her account, and interrogated
her as a suspect without complying with their obligation to inform her of
her right to remain silent.263 The officers even threatened her, stating that
they would see to it they she lost her housing subsidy if she did not cooper-
ate with them by admitting that she fabricated the rape claim.264
The police pressure on D.M. to retract the rape claim was intense, and
they effectively put words in her mouth. One of the officers admitted that
when the first written retraction statement that D.M. produced was not
satisfactory to him because it stated that the rape really happened, he in-
sisted that she rewrite it:
We went over the statement I noticed that she hadn’t mentioned
that she made up the story . . . . I asked her why she didn’t write
that she made up the story and she began crying and said that
she believed her other story actually happened.265
He pressured her to rewrite the statement to admit she lied.266 D.M. eventu-
ally did so in order to end this traumatic encounter with the police and get
out of the station.267
The methods used in Gail Sherwood’s case were nearly identical to
those used in Patty and D.M.’s cases. About two-and-a-half weeks after
Sherwood’s second rape report, she was called into the police station under
false pretenses, with police saying they needed her to bring a piece of evi-
dence that was at her home.268 She was not allowed even a single phone
call,269 but, she reported, was subjected to intense pressure to state that she
had fabricated all of the rape and stalking claims.270 According to Sherwood,
the duty solicitor that the police called for her told her that if she did not
retract her allegations, the police would see to it that she went to prison and
that she would lose her children.271 Under these circumstances, Sherwood
recanted. Strikingly, all three women later retracted their confessions.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 16.
265. Id. at Exhibit 10, 4.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 12.
268. Operation Whitney Interview Strategy, Gloucestershire Constabulary (undated) (on
file with author).
269. Letter from Gail Sherwood, supra note 5, at 26.
270. See Interview by DS Stratton with Gail Sherwood, in Stroud Police Station, Glouces-
ter, U.K. (Oct. 30, 2008).
271. Id. at 8.
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Sara Reedy was similarly pressured by detective Frank Evanson to re-
tract her rape claim, but she managed to stand her ground.272 A month after
the rape, Evanson and another officer came to her home and pressed her to
retract the rape allegation.273 Reedy stated in her deposition: “I asked him to
leave several times, just leave, leave me alone. [I said] I’m not changing my
statement. And he refused . . . . He had me completely hysterical,
and . . . [i]t was totally embarrassing, insulting.”274 Although Reedy man-
aged to resist Evanson’s pressure, her case is further evidence of the pressure
placed on rape victims to retract allegations.275
In light of the clear evidence that police officers have an incentive to
charge rape complainants with false reporting in order to manage their wor-
kloads, there is an obvious need for safeguards to be put in place to ensure
that rape cases are fully investigated and that complainants are not subjected
to this sort of pressure. Moreover, the interaction between workload man-
agement pressures and the police culture of suspicion toward rape complain-
ants work together to heighten the risk that rape complainants will be
treated unfairly—their cases are not properly investigated, and some experi-
ence pressure to retract their allegations. This, in turn, creates an intolerable
risk that genuine victims will be prosecuted for false reporting.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF GETTING RAPE WRONG
The enthusiasm of law enforcement for prosecuting women, com-
pared to the police’s careless and biased investigations of rape and
domestic violence, is remarkable. Women and children are not only
ignored when they come forward, they are accused of perverting the
course of justice, a very serious crime which can land a person in jail
for many years, or charged with offenses such as prostitution or un-
derage drinking while their attackers go free. The criminalization of
victims undermines every gain of the anti-rape movement for the last
35 years.
—Nina Lopez, Co-founder, Legal Action for Women.276
272. Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 207 (3rd Cir. 2010).
273. See Reedy, 615 F.3d at 207 (the context clearly implies that when the officers asked
Reedy to “change” her statement, they were asking her to retract the statement and
admit that she was lying about being raped).
274. Reedy, 615 F.3d at 207.
275. Evanson claims that Reedy stated, “I just want to drop the whole thing” and “I just
want this whole thing to go away.” He felt these comments were indicative of her
lying. Reedy, 615 F.3d at 211–13.
276. Written Statement from Nina Lopez, Co-Founder, Legal Action for Women (Aug. 8,
2015) (on file with author).
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The phenomena described in this Article demonstrate a widespread
failure on the part of the police to handle sexual assault complaints accord-
ing to recommended best practice. Investigators have shown disregard for
the welfare of victims by expressing skepticism of them, refusing to investi-
gate reported crimes, and actually pressuring them to withdraw allegations.
This section analyzes several consequences of these poor practices. First,
genuine victims of sexual assault have been prosecuted for false reporting as
a direct result of police failure to handle their complaints properly. Second,
a number of additional poor public policy outcomes result from this mis-
handling of rape complaints. And third, the human rights of sexual assault
victims are violated when police focus on trying to prove complainants are
lying instead of investigating their complaints.
A. False Reporting Prosecutions Ensnare Genuine Victims
It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent
suffer.
—William Blackstone277
Blackstone’s formulation notwithstanding, there appears to be an ea-
gerness to prosecute disbelieved rape complainants for false reporting de-
spite the fact that such persons could be genuine victims. Sara Reedy, D.M.,
Patty, and Jane Doe are examples of genuine rape victims who were disbe-
lieved by police and then pursued for falsely reporting rape. The IACP
Guidelines require a full investigation of each complaint precisely because
the vast majority of sexual assault allegations reported to the police are true,
and because there is no way, short of a full investigation, to accurately iden-
tify the small number of allegations that may be false. These IACP Guide-
lines require every complaint to be regarded as truthful unless, and until, a
full investigation has been completed and evidence has proven that the re-
ported assault did not happen.
This threshold was never reached in any of the cases discussed in this
Article. As demonstrated in Part Two, none of the investigations were thor-
ough, and none of them produced evidence that the reported assaults did
not happen. Therefore, under the IACP Guidelines, none of the complain-
ants should have been prosecuted for false reporting. The reason that Reedy,
D.M., Patty, and Jane Doe were cleared while Sherwood and Ibrahim were
not is the result of luck, not merit. In Reedy and D.M.’s cases, officers in
other jurisdictions continued to search for the rapists even when the
women’s local police had stopped investigating. In Jane Doe’s case, her
277. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352.
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mother’s determination to challenge the police forced them to re-investi-
gate. Sherwood and Ibrahim were not so fortunate, but their cases were
tainted by the same investigatory failures present in the other cases. And
when their local police gave up on them, they had no recourse.
How many genuine rape victims are branded as liars as a result of
police failures to follow best practices? It is difficult to say, because most
jurisdictions do not track the number of rape complaints that end in the
prosecution of the victim. But the systemic failures identified in this Article
—such as the failure to investigate rape, the culture of suspicion toward
victims, and the practice of pressuring victims to retract allegations—pro-
vide a context where it is quite possible that wrongful prosecutions of genu-
ine rape victims are widespread.
This context provides ample reason to question the entire class of ar-
rests and prosecutions of women for false rape claims. As demonstrated
above, there are compelling reasons to believe that the prosecution of genu-
ine rape victims is a systemic problem affecting many victims, Ibrahim and
Sherwood among them.
B. Poor Public Policy Outcomes That Result From the Prosecution of Rape
Victims
Police skepticism of rape complainants is likely to produce a large
number of false positives—cases where police incorrectly conclude that an
actual rape victim is lying. These false positives result in poor public policy
outcomes for rape investigation, for victims, and for society as a whole.
First, a focus on prosecuting complainants for false reporting enables rape
because police turn a blind eye to rapists while they focus instead on prose-
cuting rape victims. Second, such prosecutions further traumatize survivors
of sex crimes, thus compounding the horrors they have already experienced.
Third, such prosecutions have a chilling effect on other victims, who are
reluctant to come forward for fear that they, too, will not be believed and
will be prosecuted for false reporting. And finally, such prosecutions con-
tribute to the perpetuation of rape myths.
1. Police Inaction Enables Rapists
As the cases discussed in this Article demonstrate, failing to believe
victims and take their complaints seriously results in perpetrators being left
at large to offend repeatedly, further endangering the public. In the case of
Jon Worboys—a London cab driver who drugged and raped at least eighty-
five women before being caught—police made little effort to investigate the
victims’ complaints because they did not believe the victims’ reports of sex-
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ual assault.278 With no appetite for taking on a celebrity, police similarly
ignored several of Jimmy Savile’s victims.279 Police inaction essentially gave a
green light to both of these serial sex offenders, further emboldening them
to commit additional crimes.280
When police take their disbelief one step further and charge victims
with false reporting, they send a strong message to offenders that they can
carry on offending. The men who raped Sara Reedy, D.M., and Patty all
went on to commit further sex crimes while the police investigated the vic-
tims rather than trying to catch the rapist. Wilbur Brown raped another
woman just three months after raping Reedy and confessed to twelve sexual
assaults altogether.281 After raping D.M. in Washington state, Marc O’Leary
raped several additional women in Colorado before being captured.282 And
Patty’s assailant, Joseph Bong, committed another sexual offense during the
course of a robbery just days after raping Patty.283
After Gail Sherwood was branded a liar, she gave police a statement
indicating that her assailant continued to stalk her, sending her cards indi-
cating he was aware that she was being prosecuted for PCOJ.284 She re-
ported that one card stated, “he was really sorry my bail date had been
changed again” and that it was “unfair what she was being put through.”285
278. See Sandra Laville & Vikram Dodd, Police Errors Left Rapist John Worboys Free to
Strike – But No Officers Face Sack, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2010), http://
www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jan/20/Police-ipcc-john-worboys-errors; INDEPEN-
DENT POLICE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION, COMMISSIONER’S REPORT: IPCC INDE-
PENDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE’S INQUIRY
INTO ALLEGATIONS AGAINST JOHN WORBOYS (2010), available at https://
www.ipcc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/investigation_commissioner_
reports/worboys_commissioners_report.pdf.
279. Jimmy Savile has been called the U.K.’s most prolific sex offender and is thought to
have victimized over 400 people before his death in 2011. DAVID GRAY & PETER
WATT, GIVING VICTIMS A VOICE: JOINT REPORT INTO SEXUAL ALLEGATIONS MADE
AGAINST JIMMY SAVILE 11 (Jan. 2013), https://www.nspcc.org.uk/globalassets/docu-
ments/research-reports/yewtree-report-giving-victims-voice-jimmy-savile.pdf. In
2009, when Savile was asked by a reporter about allegations of sexual violence
against him, his response drew on the popular rape myth that women often lie about
rape: “There’s women looking for a few quid, we always get something like this
coming up to Christmas, and normally you can brush them away like midges.” Ste-
phen Wright & Miles Goslett, Savile and the Tapes that Damn the Police, DAILY MAIL
(Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2461443/Jimmy-Savile-
tapes-damn-police-The-special-treatment -allowed-DJ-escape-justice.html.
280. See id.; Laville & Dodd, supra note 278.
281. Rape in the United States Hearing, supra note 39, at 17.
282. See Burnett, supra note 72.
283. LUEDERS, supra note 65, at 193–94.
284. See Record of Tape Recorded Interview by Detective Sergeant Adrian Stratton with
Gail Sherwood, Stroud Police Station (Oct. 30, 2008) (on file with author).
285. Id.
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She also told police that shortly before the third rape, she had received a
card where the assailant stated, “how useless you all [the police]
were . . . that he could be stood next to you and piss on your boots and you
couldn’t catch him.”286
She further explained to police that when a friend had confronted her
about the fact that she had burned some of these cards rather than preserve
them as evidence, she told her friend, “What’s the point of keeping them,
giving them to the police, they don’t believe me, they say I’m a liar so
there’s no point giving them stuff because he isn’t out there as far as they’re
concerned.”287 Gloucestershire police ignored these statements, instead
clinging to their belief that Sherwood’s stalker and rapist did not exist. As
this example of police conduct in Sherwood’s case demonstrates, the deci-
sion to prosecute sexual assault complainants can actually render sexual
predators invisible to the police. Once police take the position that they do
not believe a victim, they may feel like they cannot reverse course without
looking foolish. Prosecuting complainants for false reporting thus enables
sexual predators to continue offending with impunity.
2. Further Trauma to Victims of Sex Crimes
Prosecuting a rape victim for false reporting inflicts severe trauma on
victims who are already traumatized from being raped. Rape is a highly
traumatic experience, and to report to the police, be disbelieved, and also
subjected to a criminal charge of perverting the course of justice greatly
magnifies the trauma that a rape victim has already experienced.
This trauma is further exacerbated when the women sent to prison are
mothers of minor children. Sherwood’s conviction separated her from her
children for eight months and thrust her oldest daughter into the position
of caring for her two teenage sisters.288 This forced separation from her
daughters was doubly traumatic in Sherwood’s case, because she believed
that her stalker was still at large and had entered her home on more than
one occasion.289 This left her fearing for her daughters’ safety while she was
in prison.290
Layla Ibrahim was sentenced to three years in prison when she was six
months pregnant.291 She gave birth in prison and was kept in a mother-and-
286. Id.
287. Id.
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baby unit until she was released after serving thirteen months.292 Rhiannon
Brooker was sentenced to three-and-half years and was separated from her
nine-month old daughter when she was sent to prison.293 Despite the fact
that Brooker was the mother of such a young child, the solicitor general
even tried to get her sentence lengthened.294 Brooker’s partner has stated
that their daughter “was missing her mother desperately.”295
Even if Sherwood, Ibrahim, and Brooker actually lied about being
raped, such long custodial sentences seem extraordinarily unjust for a nonvi-
olent crime and could certainly discourage other victims from reporting
rape, particularly if they have children. The compelling evidence that actual
rape victims have been separated from their children and imprisoned as a
result of police disbelief of their complaints is deeply disturbing.
3. The Chilling Effect
The one message that the prosecutions of Sherwood, Ibrahim, and
Brooker send to rape victims is not to go to the police to report rape, be-
cause the risk of being disbelieved and consequently sent to prison for false
reporting is very real. Lisa Longstaff of Women Against Rape in London has
noted that prosecuting rape victims for false reporting, and the media atten-
tion it attracts, “discourages women from coming forward and boosts the
die-hard myth that women and children often lie about rape.”296 Megan
Jones Williams, Sexual Assault Program Coordinator of the Women’s
Center in Carbondale, Illinois, stated that after the prosecution of a rape
complainant in her community, several people, including individuals calling
her agency’s crisis hot line, told her that there was no way they would report
a sexual assault out of fear that something would get twisted and they could
be charged with false reporting.297 In addition, some individuals who were
already clients of her agency when the prosecution occurred told her that
they were scared to death the police will come after them.298 If victims are
afraid to come forward, then police will have less information about sexual
292. Id.
293. Morris, Trainee Barrister Jailed for False Rape Claims, supra note 1.
294. Steven Morris, Court Rejects Call for Woman’s Jail Term Over False Rape Claims to be
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297. Telephone Interview with Megan Jones Williams, Sexual Assault Program Coordina-
tor, The Women’s Center (Sept. 4, 2013).
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2016]P O L I C E  F A I L U R E  T O  I N V E S T I G A T E  S E X  C R I M E S  C O N S E Q U E N C E S 53
predators and will be ill positioned to conduct effective investigations. Ac-
cordingly, even diligent, well-trained officers will not have access to all of
the necessary information about sexual predators in the community.
4. The Perpetuation of Rape Myths
To prosecute and even imprison those who report rape not only hurts
individual victims and scares others off reporting, it feeds the old
sexist myth that women and girls lie about rape, and shifts blame for
the low conviction rate away from the authorities. We have uncov-
ered at least 109 women who were prosecuted after reporting rape in
the past five years. This must stop.
—Lisa Longstaff, Women Against Rape299
The practice of prosecuting complainants for falsely reporting rape
perpetuates the myth that women often lie about being raped. Although
actual false allegations of rape are extremely rare,300 cases where women are
prosecuted tend to get a great deal of press coverage, most of which is un-
sympathetic to the accused. In the cases of Sherwood, Ibrahim, and
Brooker, several newspapers ran unflattering headlines such as “Mother Of
Three Who Faked Elaborate Rape Scenes ‘For Attention’ Jailed For Two
Years;”301 ”‘Wicked’ Woman Who Cried Rape Is Jailed For Three Years De-
spite Being Seven Months Pregnant;”302 and “Law Graduate Faces Jail After
Lying About Being Raped 11 Times By Boyfriend To Excuse Exam Fail-
ures.”303 In these cases, only one newspaper—the Guardian—gave any con-
299. Written Statement from Lisa Longstaff, Women Against Rape (Aug. 8, 2015) (on file
with author).
300. See KELLY ET AL., supra note 17, at 83; Lisak et al., supra note 17, at 1330; Lonsway
et al., supra note 17, at 2.
301. Daily Mail Reporter, Mother of Three Who Faked Elaborate Rape Scenes ‘For Attention’
Jailed for Two Years, DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Mar. 4, 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-1255594/Mother-faked-elaborate-rape-scenes-attention-jailed-
years.html.
302. James Tozer, ‘Wicked’ Woman Who Cried Rape is Jailed for Three Years Despite Being
Seven Months Pregnant, DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Jul. 16, 2010, http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1294947/Leyla-Ibrahim-jailed-crying-rape-de-
spite-7-months-pregnant.html.
303. Richard Hartley-Parkinson, Law Graduate Who Falsely Accused Boyfriend of Rape to
Get Out of Exams is Jailed, MIRROR (U.K.), Jun. 26, 2014, http://www.mirror.co.uk/
news/uk-news/law-graduate-who-falsely-accused-3768882.
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sideration to the investigatory failures in these cases that suggested that the
complainants might have been telling the truth.304
These headlines’ pejorative portrayal is particularly troubling in light
of the fact that the investigations into Ibrahim and Sherwood’s complaints
were inadequate, under the IACP Guidelines, to support a conclusion that
the complaints were false. This sort of press coverage exploits failed rape
investigations to reinforce the myth that women frequently lie about rape.
The beliefs that are perpetuated in this way then affect not just the general
public, but also the judges and prosecutors involved in subsequent cases.
For instance, Judge Julian Lambert presided over the Gail Sherwood
prosecution in 2010 as well as Rhiannon Brooker’s prosecution in 2014. At
Sherwood’s sentencing, Lambert described Sherwood as having a “perverted
mind” that invented a “malicious fantasy world.”305 In light of the evidence
strongly indicating that Sherwood’s case was never properly investigated, the
decision to prosecute her likely strengthened rape myths that then harmed
Brooker’s chance at a fair trial since Brooker’s case was heard by the same
judge. Lambert used similar adjectives to describe Brooker and then said, in
a bizarre twist, that her actions made it more difficult for real rape victims
to be believed in court.306 It is not the actions of rape complainants, but
rather the police failure to properly investigate these cases that creates hard-
ship for future rape victims.
This section has demonstrated that the practice of charging rape vic-
tims with false reporting results in several adverse public policy outcomes
including the perpetuation of rape myths, a chilling effect which prevents
victims from coming forward, further trauma to victims, and impunity for
rapists. The next section considers the human rights violations that occur.
C. Violations of the Human Rights of Rape Victims
Both the failure to investigate rape and the abhorrent practice of
charging rape complainants with false reporting result in human rights vio-
lations under the British Human Rights Act (“HRA”), the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), and other treaties. These practices
also result in constitutional rights violations in the United States.307 This
304. See, e.g., Hattenstone & Hirsch, supra note 78; Morris, Jailed for Crying Rape:
Fantasist or Genuine Victim? supra note 79; Morris, Trainee Barrister Jailed for False
Rape Claims, supra note 1.
305. Morris, Woman Gets Two Years for False Rape Claims, supra note 5.
306. Morris, Trainee Barrister Jailed for False Rape Claims, supra note 1. Lambert called
Brooker’s actions “utterly wicked.” Id.
307. Failure to investigate and prosecute rape can be part of a pattern or practice of gen-
der discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion. See supra note 55.
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section of the Article more fully examines some of the violations that occur
under human rights treaties.
1. State Breach of the Duty to Investigate and Punish: Violations of
HRA, ECHR, CEDAW, and the Istanbul Convention
The due diligence principle in international human rights law pro-
vides a way to measure whether states have complied with their obligations
to respect, protect, and fulfill individuals’ human rights. In accordance with
this principle, states might be responsible for private acts of violence if they
“fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate
and punish acts of violence.”308 As a result of this principle, failure to inves-
tigate rape violates Article 3 of the HRA and ECHR, as well as the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW”).309
The Council of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combatting
Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (the “Istanbul Conven-
tion”) also obligates state parties to “take the necessary legislative or other
measures to protect all victims from any further acts of violence.”310 It fur-
ther requires state parties to ensure that there are “appropriate mechanisms
to provide for effective cooperation between all relevant state agencies” in
supporting victims.311 Moreover, state parties must ensure that measures
taken must be “based on a gendered understanding of violence against
women,” must “focus on the human rights and safety of the victim,” and
must aim at “avoiding secondary victimisation.”312
Prosecuting complainants for allegedly false allegations of rape, when
their complaints have not been fully investigated and unequivocally deter-
308. U.N., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Rec-
ommendation No. 19, 11th Sess., ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992) [hereinafter Gen.
Rec. No. 19].
309. See DSD & NBV v. The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, [2014] EWHC
QB 436, ¶ 12–13 (U.K.); Gen. Rec. No. 19, supra note 308, at ¶ 9.
310. Council of Eur. Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women
and Domestic Violence, art. 18.1, Apr. 12, 2011, C.E.T.S. No. 210 [hereinafter
Istanbul Convention].
311. Id. at art. 18.2.
312. Id. at art. 18.3. Secondary victimization occurs when institutions that are supposed
to provide services to rape victims do so in a manner that is victim-blaming, insensi-
tive, or prioritizes the needs of the institution over the needs of the victim, thus
resulting in further trauma to the victim. See Priscilla Schulz (2000) (article review)
(reviewing Rebecca Campbell & Sheela Raja, Secondary Victimization of Rape Vic-
tims: Insights from Mental Health Professionals Who Treat Survivors of Violence, 14(3)
VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 26 (1999)), available at https://mainweb-v.musc.edu/vaw-
prevention/research/victimrape.shtml.
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mined to be false, violates these requirements. In these cases, complainants
experience secondary victimization when they are disbelieved and prose-
cuted. Their rights are also violated because the state decision to prosecute
the complainant (rather than investigate the rape) is taken contrary to the
mandate to focus on the human rights and safety of the victim, and to take
measures based on a gendered understanding of violence against women.
Moreover, when such victims are subjected to further acts of violence from
private perpetrators because the state has failed to adequately protect the
victim, a violation of the Istanbul Convention also occurs. This type of
violation very likely happened in the case of Gail Sherwood, who was raped
repeatedly when her local police failed to take her complaints seriously.
Such convention violations are also a concern in cases involving stalking,
where threatening behaviors can be repetitive and victims become terrified
because they do not know when the perpetrator will strike again.
Furthermore, some of these prosecutions, such as the cases of Rhian-
non Brooker and Eleanor de Freitas, have involved prosecutions moving
forward at the behest of the British Crown Prosecution Service over the
strong objections of the police.313 For example, rape complainant Eleanor de
Freitas took her own life in April 2014, just three days before she was to
stand trial for perverting the course of justice when prosecutors disbelieved
her rape complaint. The CPS had moved forward with the prosecution of
de Freitas despite the fact that the police officers involved in the rape inves-
tigation believed de Freitas and refused to cooperate with prosecutors.314
In these cases, there was a violation of the requirement that all relevant
state agencies cooperate effectively in order to support victims. The priority
in all cases involving gender-based violence must be to ensure that no fur-
ther violence is inflicted on the victim.315 In summary, for a state entity to
treat a person reporting gender-based violence as a suspect for false report-
ing after an inadequate or nonexistent investigation is a very grave matter.
This treatment of victims violates the Istanbul Convention’s principles enu-
313. See, e.g. Morris, Trainee Barrister Jailed for False Rape Claims, supra note 1; Interview
with Nigel Richardson, Solicitor, in London, U.K. (Dec. 11, 2014); Sandra Laville,
Eleanor de Freitas Should Never Have been Charged, Police Say, THE GUARDIAN
(U.K.) (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/dec/09/police-
eleanor-de-freitas-rape-complaint-perverting-course-justice; Humble Memorial of
David De Freitas, Application to Attorney General for Reference of the Inquest to
the High Court (July 6, 2015), paras. 40–44 (on file with author).
314. The Humble Memorial of David de Freitas, Application to Attorney General for
Reference of the Inquest to the High Court (on file with author); Sandra Laville,
Eleanor de Freitas Should Never Have Been Charged, Police Say, THE GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Dec. 9, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/dec/09/police-el
eanor-de-freitas-rape-complaint-perverting-course-justice.
315. See Istanbul Convention, supra note 310, at art. 18(1).
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merated above—particularly the obligation to place priority on the victim’s
human rights and safety, to avoid secondary victimization, and to protect
the victim from further acts of violence.
2. The Right to be Free from Torture or Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment
Article 3 of the HRA316 and ECHR317 protects individuals from tor-
ture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Rape qualifies as cruel, in-
human, and degrading treatment, and can rise to the level of torture.318 The
police failure to adequately investigate rape complaints violates Article 3 of
the HRA and ECHR because such failure contributes to the cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment experienced by victims.319 In cases where po-
lice go on to charge a rape victim with false reporting after they have failed
to fully investigate her case, the Article 3 violations are magnified. It is inhu-
mane and degrading to accuse a victim of lying when her case has not been
fully investigated, and it is similarly poor treatment to pressure her to retract
her allegations and to threaten her with prosecution in the event that she
does not retract.
In addition to these Article 3 violations, charging a rape victim with
false reporting also strips away her entitlement to lifetime anonymity.320
Moreover, a conviction can leave a victim with a criminal record, which can
make it difficult or impossible for her to find employment. These conse-
quences may also fall under Article 3.
3. The Right to Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex
Article 14 of both the HRA321 and the ECHR322 state that the enjoy-
ment of the rights and freedoms set out in these conventions shall be “se-
cured without discrimination on any ground,” including sex. Both rape
316. Human Rights Act, 1998, c.42, sch. 1, art. 3 (U.K.).
317. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
318. DSD & NBV v. The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, [2014] EWHC
QB 436, [1] (U.K.); see generally M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003-XIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1;
Maslova and Nalbandov v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-84670; Aydin v. Turkey [GC], 19997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1866.
319. Human Rights Act, supra note 316, art. 3; European Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 317, art. 3. See also DSD & NBV, [2014] EWHC QB 436 (U.K.) (find-
ing that failure to investigate rape is an Article 3 violation); M.C., 2003-XIII Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1.
320. Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 1992, c. 34 (U.K.), available at http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1992/34/pdfs/ukpga_19920034_en.pdf.
321. Human Rights Act, supra note 316, at art. 14.
322. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 317, at art. 14.
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victims whose cases are not adequately investigated and those who are ac-
cused of false reporting experience violations of their rights under CEDAW
as well as Article 14 of the HRA323 and ECHR.324 In most cases, the Article
14 right to nondiscrimination on the basis of sex is violated because the vast
majority of rape complainants are female and the majority of perpetrators
are male.325 Consequently, the police failure to believe rape victims and fail-
ure to investigate their cases has a disproportionate impact upon women,
because police do not take effective action against crimes involving sexual
offenses against women. The largely male composition of most police
forces326 is another factor that contributes to the violation of Article 14.
Male officers may be more likely than female officers to adhere to certain
rape myths, such as the belief that men cannot be raped, and the notion
that many rape complainants are actually lying.327 The continued state reli-
ance on police forces that are disproportionately male may also contribute
to the Article 14 violations of rape victims’ human rights for these reasons.
When rape victims are charged with false reporting, the Article 14
violations are magnified because these cases typically involve male officers
expressing skepticism of female victims, pressuring female victims to retract
their complaints, and initiating charges against female victims. As demon-
strated above, Sara Reedy, D.M., Patty, and Gail Sherwood were all pres-
sured by skeptical male officers to retract their rape allegations, and all were
subsequently charged with false reporting.
It is striking that in the twenty-first century, police and judicial au-
thorities have failed to perceive the discriminatory nature of poor police
practice around rape and they have failed to implement measures to correct
for this systemic gender discrimination. Although the IACP Guidelines, if
followed, would go a long way toward ensuring that rape complainants re-
ceive unbiased treatment, they are only effective if the guidelines are
adopted by police departments and stringently followed. Poor police prac-
tices urgently require change in order to end Article 14 violations.
323. Human Rights Act, supra note 316, at art. 14.
324. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 317, at art. 14.
325. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NA-
TURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE VICTIMIZATION: FINDINGS FROM THE NA-
TIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 21 (2006).
326. See LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, WOMEN IN LAW ENFORCE-
MENT, 1987–2008 (2010); ELEANOR WOODS, POLICE WORKFORCE, ENGLAND
AND WALES, 31 MARCH 2015, HOME OFFICE STATISTICS (2015).
327. SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 28–29.
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4. The Right to an Effective Remedy
Article 13 of the HRA and ECHR states that anyone who experiences
a violation of a convention right shall have a right to an effective remedy
before a national authority.328 Rape victims whose cases are not investigated
also experience violations of their rights under Article 13 of the HRA and
ECHR. Their Article 13 rights are violated because they are denied an effec-
tive remedy when the police fail to take diligent action in response to their
complaints of rape or other ill treatment falling within Article 3. When
victims are charged with false reporting, the Article 13 violations are magni-
fied because not only are they denied any effective remedy for being raped,
they are also treated as suspects. The result is that they are thrust into an
even worse situation than they would have faced had they never gone to the
police.
Violations of rape victims’ human rights under Articles 13 and 14
have not yet been tested in court, but it would be timely for such a case to
be brought in the wake of the DSD and NBV decision.329
5. The Right to a Fair Trial
When rape victims are charged with false reporting, there is typically a
violation of the Article 6 right to a fair trial.330 This is because, as this
Article had demonstrated, the decision to charge the complainant is usually
made before the police have completed a full investigation of the rape com-
plaint.331 Consequently, the jury does not have access to all of the informa-
tion relevant to the case. Moreover, these cases have not been put before
juries with any sensitivity for the high levels of police skepticism exhibited
toward rape complainants, the police failure to adequately investigate these
cases, and the strong evidence that police regularly pressure victims to re-
tract their allegations. Without this context, and in light of the deep levels
of skepticism demonstrated toward victims facing these charges, a fair trial is
virtually impossible.
6. The Right Against Self-Incrimination
As this Article has demonstrated, in several cases where rape victims
have been charged with false reporting, police have pressured victims to
328. Human Rights Act, supra note 316, at art. 13; European Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 317, at art. 13.
329. DSD & NBV, [2014] EWHC (QB) at [10], [14] (U.K.).
330. Human Rights Act, supra note 316, at art. 6; European Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 317, at art. 6.
331. KELLY ET AL., supra note 17, at 36–53.
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recant in circumstances where they have been held in custody and ques-
tioned as suspects without receiving a warning of their right to remain si-
lent.332 In the United States context, suspects must be read their Miranda
rights.333 This right was violated in the cases of Reedy, D.M., and Patty.334
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Leadership is about challenging myths, not exploiting them.
—Rodger Patrick, Former Chief Inspector, West Midlands Police
335
In light of the multiple problems with rape investigation enumerated
in this Article, a number of recommendations are in order. First, police
forces must implement safeguards to protect victims from wrongful prose-
cution. Second, the police response to rape generally must be strengthened
and perverse incentives eliminated. Third, transparency is essential to im-
proving how rape complaints are handled. Finally, victims who have been
wrongfully prosecuted deserve measures to remedy miscarriages of justice.
A. Safeguarding Victims from Prosecution: Stop False Reporting Prosecutions
and Adopt the IACP Best Practice Guidelines
The analysis presented in this Article casts significant doubt on the
legitimacy of prosecutions that target disbelieved rape complainants for false
reporting. It demonstrates that at least some of those prosecuted are genuine
victims, and that many more may also be genuine victims, in light of the
culture of suspicion toward rape complainants and the widespread rape in-
vestigation failures that precede such prosecutions. It is beyond belief that
any advanced society prosecutes genuine sexual assault victims for lying. It is
equally surprising that those responsible for such policies have not perceived
the need to closely scrutinize these practices in order to prevent exactly this
type of prosecution from occurring.
Such prosecutions must stop. The priority of police forces must be to
improve the investigation and prosecution of rape. A focus on prosecuting
disbelieved complainants ensnares genuine victims, erroneously perpetuates
332. See Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 207 (3rd Cir. 2010); D.M. Complaint, supra
note 135, at ¶ 99; LUEDERS, supra note 65, at 58-63.
333. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
334. Reedy, 615 F.3d at 207; D.M. Complaint, supra note 135, at ¶ 99; LUEDERS, supra
note 65, at 58-63.
335. Interview with Rodger Patrick, Former Chief Inspector, West Midlands Police, in
West Midlands, UK (Aug. 6, 2015).
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the myth that women often lie about being raped, and detracts from the
more critical goal of prosecuting violent sexual offenders.
Sexual assault expert David Lisak has offered the following cautionary
note regarding such prosecutions:
The bottom line is this: with a twenty percent reporting rate,
and an enormous amount of case attrition, the vast majority of
rapists run free to prey on vulnerable members of society. Most
of these offenders are serial rapists, and many of them amass
large numbers of victims over the course of their offending ca-
reers. These offenders should be the focus of our efforts and energy,
not the tiny fraction of victims who maliciously make false reports
(emphasis added).336
Similarly, shadow attorney general337 Emily Thornberry has stated
that the British government’s priority ought to be ensuring that more rapists
are successfully prosecuted and addressing “the widening gulf between the
soaring numbers of rape allegations made to the police and the dwindling
proportion that ever get prosecuted.”338
Accordingly, best practice entails stopping the prosecution of rape
complainants and instead focusing on the investigation and prosecution of
rape. Genuine false reports are so rare that a policy focused on rooting out
and prosecuting such cases is unjustified and carries too many adverse
risks—in particular, the risks that rapists will be free to reoffend repeatedly,
that genuine rape victims will be the targets of such prosecutions, and that
some victims will not come forward due to fear of being disbelieved and
prosecuted.
In addition, police forces affected by a culture of suspicion toward
rape victims and a failure to believe them should adopt the IACP Guide-
lines’ protocol for handling suspected false reports. As we have seen, these
guidelines require that police (1) undertake a thorough investigation into
each rape complaint; (2) label the report “false” only where evidence clearly
336. Email from Dr. David Lisak, Forensic Consultant, to Lisa Avalos, author (Sept. 1,
2013) (on file with author).
337. In the UK Parliament, the Official Opposition party nominates a Member of the
Parliament to shadow each of the members of the Cabinet, ensuring that the Oppo-
sition can question each government department thoroughly. Shadow Cabinet, Glos-
sary Page, UK PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/
shadow-cabinet/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2016).
338. Steven Morris, Court Rejects Call for Woman’s Jail Term Over False Rape Claims to be
Increased, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 25, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/
2014/sep/25/court-rejects-solicitor-general-rhiannon-brooker-jail-term-false-rape-
claims.
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indicates that no crime was committed or attempted; and (3) ensure that
they do not rely on common victim reactions to sexual assault—including
discrepancies in the victim’s account and a victim’s retracted allegation—
when determining that a report is false.339
In order for these best practice guidelines to be effective, compliance
with them must be mandatory and not merely recommended. Police officers
should be required to document that they have fully investigated each rape
complaint and that they have not aborted a rape investigation because they
did not believe the victim. If police conclude that a report is false, they
should be required to document that they have actual evidence that sup-
ports this conclusion and that they have not relied on the complainant’s
reactions to the rape, or other post-assault behavior, in reaching that conclu-
sion. If the cases analyzed here are any guide, consistent use of the IACP
Guidelines will result in much more thorough investigations of rape and far
fewer false allegations charges against complainants. Only by making these
best practice guidelines mandatory will victims be adequately safeguarded
against wrongful prosecution.
B. Strengthen Rape Investigation More Generally
Robust sexual assault investigation guidelines exist in both the United
States and Britain; the problem is that compliance with such guidance is
uneven and left to the discretion of individual officers.340 In light of the
serious consequences that result when sexual assault is not taken seriously
and not properly investigated, this state of affairs is unacceptable and must
change. The public interest requires higher standards in how rape is investi-
gated and prosecuted.
It is essential that each jurisdiction develop procedures for holding
police accountable for conducting thorough rape investigations in compli-
ance with recommended best practice. The IACP, End Violence Against
Women International, Human Rights Watch, and the Start by Believing
Campaign all offer more detailed guidance on specific approaches police can
take to strengthen rape investigation and ensure officer accountability.341
Jurisdictions such as Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Kansas City, Missouri; and
339. See IACP GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 13.
340. DAME ELISH ANGIOLINI, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW INTO THE INVES-
TIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF RAPE IN LONDON 10 (Apr. 30, 2015), available at
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/equality/vaw/dame_elish_angiolini_rape_review
_2015.pdf; see generally IACP GUIDELINES, supra note 15.
341. See generally IACP GUIDELINES, supra note 15; END VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.evawintl.org/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2015); IMPROVING
POLICE RESPONSE, supra note 84; and START BY BELIEVING, http://
www.startbybelieving.org/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2015).
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Austin, Texas offer models of excellent practice.342 Implementing policies
for ensuring that all sexual assault investigations comply with best practice
guidelines will eliminate the human rights violations that occur as a result of
the failure to properly investigate rape.
Furthermore, perverse incentives must be eliminated. Police depart-
ments and other stakeholders must ensure that it does not advantage police
officers to fail to record sex crimes, pressure victims to retract, or charge
complainants with false reporting. In fact, police officers should be expressly
prohibited from pressuring victims to retract allegations, and they should be
subject to disciplinary action if they do so. Instead, officers investigating
rape should be rewarded based on the thoroughness of their investigations
and their effectiveness in actually securing convictions of rapists.
C. Transparency: External Review of Sexual Assault Investigations
Jurisdictions with strong sexual assault investigation policies are in-
creasingly using an external review process to ensure that police follow best
practices in investigating sexual assault. For example, some experts recom-
mend a multidisciplinary external advisory board consisting of professionals
from the community (victim advocates, prosecutors, and others) who can
advise the police and help to implement a coordinated community response
to sexual assault.343 Such a board can also help ensure that police have fully
explored all investigatory leads on each case, and that prosecutors prosecute
every case where it is feasible to do so.344
This type of review board was implemented in Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania, in the late 1990s as part of an overhaul to correct poor sexual
assault investigation practices; it is now an entrenched part of the commu-
nity approach to sexual assault there.345 More recently, similar review panels
have been implemented in Missoula, Montana, and Washington, D.C., in
response to investigations into prior poor practices.346 Other cities that em-
brace transparency by using an external review process include Baltimore,
Maryland; Grand Rapids, Michigan; and Lafayette Parish, Louisiana.347
342. IMPROVING POLICE RESPONSE, supra note 84, at 23-31.
343. Lonsway et al., supra note 17, at 8.
344. IMPROVING POLICE RESPONSE, supra note 84, at 32-34.
345. See Rape in the United States Hearing, supra note 39, at 12 (statement of Carol E.
Tracy, Executive Director, Women’s Law Project); IMPROVING POLICE RESPONSE,
supra note 84, at 29-30.
346. Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Justice and the
City of Missoula, supra note 56, at 11-13; DC Council Passes Landmark Sexual As-
sault Reforms, COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR SAFE SPACES (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.
collectiveactiondc.org/tag/sexual-assault-victims-rights-amendment-act-of-2013/.
347. IMPROVING POLICE RESPONSE, supra note 84, at 32-34.
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When an external review process is in place, the organizations involved
would likely identify any case that had not been fully investigated well
before it reached a point where police charged the complainant with false
reporting.
D. Remedying Miscarriages of Justice
My daughter still maintains she was attacked . . . . I will fight for
her innocence to my dying day. What happened to her was horrific,
she suffered that night, she suffered in prison and she is still
suffering.
—Sandra Allen, mother of Layla Ibrahim348
Convictions of rape complainants who maintain their innocence must
be re-examined. Where the original investigation fell short of the best prac-
tice standards discussed here, such convictions should be overturned, the
complainants’ criminal records should be expunged, and complainants com-
pensated financially for their poor treatment. In each case where the perpe-
trator remains at large, the rape investigation must be reopened. Given the
devastating effects that a wrongful conviction can have on an innocent per-
son, these types of cases should be re-examined regardless of how long ago
the conviction occurred.
Moreover, because of the information that has come to light in Britain
in the last few years about the systemic under-recording of crime and the
massive failures to investigate rape,349 victims of these terrible practices
should, as a class, have their cases reopened without having to undertake a
lengthy and expensive appeals process. For a rape victim to be prosecuted
for false reporting is a particularly extraordinary miscarriage of justice. Not
only is the accused innocent of any crime: she is also a crime victim. These
prosecutions must be stopped. 
348. Laville, 109 Women Prosecuted for False Rape Claims in Five Years, supra note 76.
349. As discussed in Part III supra.
